When regulation is expropriation by Santikko, Jenny
  
 
 
 
 
When regulation is expropriation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law 
Degree Programme in Master of Law 
Master’s thesis 
Supervisor: Prof. Jan Klabbers 
by Jenny Santikko 
2.9.2019 
 
 
 
!
!
!!
!
Tiedekunta!–!Fakultet!–!Faculty!!
Faculty!of!Law!
!!
Koulutusohjelma!–!Utbildingsprogram!–!Degree!Programme!!
Degree!Programme!in!Master!of!Law!
Tekijä!–!Författare!–!Author!
!Jenny!Santikko!
Työn!nimi!–!Arbetets!titel!–!Title!
When!regulation!is!expropriation!
!!
Oppiaine/Opintosuunta!–!Läroämne/Studieinriktning!–!Subject/Study!track!
International!law!!
!
Työn!laji!–!Arbetets!art!–!Level!!
Master’s!thesis!
!!
Aika!–!Datum!–!Month!and!year!
!2.9.2019!
Sivumäärä!–!Sidoantal!–!Number!of!pages!
!63!
Tiivistelmä!–!Referat!–!Abstract!
!
This!thesis!aims!to!answer!the!question!of!when!regulatory!measures!taken!with!regard!to!environmental!concerns!
amount! to! expropriation.! International! investment! treaties! provide! protection! against! both! direct! and! indirect!
expropriation!and!initially!cover!also!indirect!takings!caused!by!regulatory!measures.!!Two!opposite!doctrines,!the!sole!
effects! doctrine! and! the! police! powers! doctrine,! have! evolved! to! answer! the! very! question! of! when! regulatory!
measures!amount!to!expropriation.!In!this!thesis!I!will!execute!a!doctrinal!study!in!order!to!argue!that!while!the!police!
powers! doctrine!might! be!more! politically! legitimate,! it! does! not! find! sufficient! legal! support! from! the! sources! of!
international!law,!and!therefore,!the!sole!effects!doctrine!finding!firm!legal!support!from!the!investment!treaties!should!
prevail.!
!!!The! sole! effects! doctrine! determines! the! existence! of! regulatory! expropriation! by! examining! the! effect! that! the!
regulatory!measure!has!on! the! investment.!This!doctrine! finds! its! legal! support! from! the! investment! treaties.! It! is!
supported!by!the!wordings!and!terms!used! in!the!expropriation!clauses.!When!interpreting!the! investment!treaties!
according!to!the!rules!of!treaty!interpretation!laid!down!in!the!Article!31!of!the!Vienna!Convention!on!Law!of!Treaties,!
it!is!rather!evident!that!the!sole!effects!doctrine!should!prevail.!The!police!powers!doctrine!on!the!other!hand!states!
that!measures!falling!into!the!police!powers!of!the!state!fall!out!of!the!scope!of!indirect!expropriation.!According!to!the!
police!powers!doctrine!nonZdiscriminatory!regulatory!measures!that!are!taken!in!the!public!interest!and!enacted!with!
due!process! shall! not! be!deemed!expropriatory!and!compensable.!The!police!powers!doctrine!does!not! find!any!
support!from!the!investment!treaties!and!the!expropriation!clauses!initially!cover!general!regulatory!measures.!Thus!
the!police!powers!doctrine!relies!on!its!alleged!support!from!the!customary!international!law.!!
!!!In! order! to! determine! if! the! police! powers! doctrine! is! legally! sustainable,! I! will! first! analyse! the! rulings! of! the!
investment!tribunals,!and!observe!how!the!tribunals!have!answered!the!question!of!regulatory!expropriation.!In!the!
case!law!analysis,!I!will!conclude!that!tribunals!tend!to!determine!indirect!expropriation!by!referring!to!the!effect!of!the!
measure.! Correspondingly,! the! initial! examination! of! the! existence! of! an! indirect! expropriation! is! executed! by!
examining!the!effect!that!the!government!measure!has!on!the!investment.!As!to!the!question!of!the!weight!given!to!
the!public!interest!concerns,!no!unified!opinion!is!to!be!found.!Some!of!the!tribunals!do!endorse!the!police!powers!
doctrine!but!no!unified!practice!seems!to!exist!also!on!this!regard.!The!placement!and!way!of!endorsement!of!the!
police!powers!doctrine!in!the!practice!suggest!that!the!police!powers!doctrine!is!a!possible!exception!doctrine.!The!
treaty!clauses!regarding!expropriation!do!not!include!exceptions!of!any!kind,!and!therefore,!in!order!to!support!the!
police! powers! doctrine! this! exception! needs! to! be! found! from! the! customary! international! law.! Since! a! profound!
examination!of!the!existence!of!a!customary!international!law!norm!would!require!extensive!research,!in!this!thesis!
will!concentrate!on!pointing!out!factors!that!indicate!that!such!norm!odes!not!exists.!!
!!!After!concluding!that!the!police!powers!doctrine!does!not!find!sufficient!legal!support!from!the!investment!treaties!
or!from!the!customary!international!law,!I!will!discuss!the!argument!that!the!police!powers!doctrine!often!uses!to!
justify!itself!and!that!is!the!need!for!balancing!the!interests.!I!will!also!discuss!shortly!about!the!transplantation!of!the!
proportionality!analysis!into!the!investment!treaty!sphere!and!conclude!that!neither!of!these!gives!support!to!the!
endorsement!of!the!police!powers!doctrine.!At!the!end!of!the!thesis!I!can!conclude!that!since!the!police!powers!
doctrine!does!not!find!sufficient!legal!support,!the!sole!effects!doctrine!should!prevail.!
Avainsanat!–!Nyckelord!–!Keywords!
!International!investment!law,!investment!protection,!expropriation,!indirect!expropriation,!regulatory!expropriation,!the!sole!effects!
doctrine,!the!police!powers!doctrine,!environmental!regulation!
Ohjaaja!tai!ohjaajat!–!Handledare!–!Supervisor!or!supervisors!!
Prof.!Jan!Klabbers!
!
Säilytyspaikka!–!Förvaringställe!–!Where!deposited!
!!
Muita!tietoja!–!Övriga!uppgifter!–!Additional!information!
!
!
  
Table of Contents 
 
1.#Introduction#.............................................................................................................................#1!1.1.!A!short!introduction!to!the!thesis!............................................................................................................!1!1.2.!Limitations!and!remarks!..............................................................................................................................!2!1.2.1.!Fragmentation!of!the!treaty!base!.....................................................................................................!2!1.2.2.!Concentration!on!the!‘representative’!expropriation!clauses!.............................................!3!1.2.3.!Concentration!on!the!investment!treaties!...................................................................................!3!1.2.4.!Concentration!on!the!cases!with!environmental!connection!..............................................!4!
2.#Investor#and#Investment#.....................................................................................................#5!2.1.!Introducing!the!terms!...................................................................................................................................!5!2.2.!Investor!................................................................................................................................................................!5!2.3.!Investment!.........................................................................................................................................................!8!2.3.1.!The!broad!concept!of!investment!....................................................................................................!8!2.3.2.!Contracts!as!investments!....................................................................................................................!9!
3.#Expropriation#.......................................................................................................................#11!3.1.!The!sovereign!right!to!expropriate!........................................................................................................!11!3.2.!Lawful!expropriation!...................................................................................................................................!11!3.2.1.!Criteria!for!lawful!expropriation!....................................................................................................!11!3.2.2.!Unlawful!expropriation!......................................................................................................................!13!3.3.!Direct!expropriation!....................................................................................................................................!13!3.4.!Indirect!expropriation!.................................................................................................................................!14!3.4.1.!The!concept!of!indirect!expropriation!.........................................................................................!14!3.4.2.!Control!and!deprivation!of!the!economic!value!of!the!investment!.................................!16!3.4.3.!Duration!of!the!measure!....................................................................................................................!16!3.4.4.!Legitimate!expectations!.....................................................................................................................!17!3.4.5.!Omissions!constituting!an!indirect!expropriation!.................................................................!17!3.4.6.!Regulatory!expropriation!..................................................................................................................!18!3.5.!Creeping!expropriation!...............................................................................................................................!18!
4.#The#two#doctrines#...............................................................................................................#20!4.1.!The!sole!effects!doctrine!............................................................................................................................!20!4.2.!The!police!powers!doctrine!......................................................................................................................!21!
5.#The#interpretation#of#the#investment#treaties#..........................................................#23!5.1.!The!rules!of!treaty!interpretation!..........................................................................................................!23!5.2.!The!principle!of!restrictive!interpretation!.........................................................................................!24!5.3.!Pacta!sunt!servanda!and!the!Article!27!of!the!VCLT!......................................................................!25!
6.#Conflict#of#norms?#...............................................................................................................#26!
7.#Case#law#analysis#.................................................................................................................#28!7.1.!Intro!to!the!case!law!analysis!...................................................................................................................!28!7.2.!Santa!Elena!v.!Costa!Rica!............................................................................................................................!28!7.3.!Metalclad!v.!Mexico!......................................................................................................................................!29!7.4.!Biwater!v.!Tanzania!......................................................................................................................................!31!
 7.5.!Chemtura!Corporation!v.!Canada!...........................................................................................................!33!7.6.!S.D.!Myers!v.!Canada!.....................................................................................................................................!34!7.7.!Burlington!v.!Ecuador!..................................................................................................................................!36!7.8.!Methanex!v.!United!States!of!America!..................................................................................................!38!7.9.!Tecmed!v.!Mexico!..........................................................................................................................................!39!7.10.!Conclusions!of!the!case!law!analysis!..................................................................................................!41!
8.#The#Critique#..........................................................................................................................#43!8.1.!The!purpose!of!the!critique!.......................................................................................................................!43!8.2.!The!lack!of!legal!support!from!the!investment!treaties!................................................................!43!8.3.!The!lack!of!support!from!customary!international!law!................................................................!46!8.4.!Search!for!the!balance!.................................................................................................................................!52!8.5.!Proportionality!analysis!.............................................................................................................................!54!8.5.1.!Transplantation!of!the!proportionality!analysis!.....................................................................!54!8.5.2.!Placement!of!the!proportionality!analysis!.................................................................................!55!8.5.3.!Proportionality!analysis!and!a!law!making!judge!...................................................................!57!8.5.4.!The!police!powers!doctrine!and!the!proportionality!test!...................................................!58!8.6.!Conclusions!of!the!critique!........................................................................................................................!58!
9.#The#next#generation#of#expropriation#clauses#..........................................................#60!
10.#Conclusions#.........................................................................................................................#63!
Bibliography#..............................................................................................................................#64!
!
 
 
 
 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 Abbreviations  
 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN 
 
Bilateral Investment Treaty - BIT 
 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (EU -  Canada) - CETA 
 
Energy Charter Treaty - ECT 
 
European Court of Human Rights - ECHR 
 
European Court of Justice - ECJ 
 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes - ICSID 
 
International Law Commission - ILC 
 
International Court of Justice - ICJ 
 
North American Free Trade Agreement - NAFTA 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties - VCLT 
 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 
!
!
!
! !
 1 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. A short introduction to the thesis 
!
The question of when regulatory measures may amount to expropriation has taunted 
arbitrators and legal scholars for several decades.1 Foreign investors are protected by a web 
of international investment treaties in which the states have promised to protect the investors 
against both direct and indirect expropriations. The concept of indirect expropriation has had 
a long history of controversy. The controversy culminates in the tension found between the 
promised standard of protection and the legitimate regulatory interests of the host state. 
Expropriation clauses do not exclude regulatory measures per se from the scope of indirect 
expropriations,2 and therefore, the promised standard of protection initially includes 
protection against indirect expropriation caused by regulatory measures. States have been 
reluctant to agree that regulatory measures taken in the public interest could be deemed 
expropriatory, and the state would be obligated to compensate the negatively affected 
investor. To protect their regulatory freedom, states have appealed to their police powers  
recognized under the customary international law.3 
The tension between investment protection and states’ regulatory interests is especially 
high regarding measures that are connected to environmental concerns. In the past few 
decades, the seriousness of the increasing amount of environmental issues has been 
acknowledged at a global level. It is widely agreed that more stricter action needs to be taken 
and fast. States are facing increased pressure to take regulative action in order to protect and 
preserve the environment. It is both legally and politically challenging to answer the tense 
question of when regulatory acts connected to environmental concerns should be deemed 
expropriatory, and the state obliged to compensate the investor for the negative effects of the  
regulatory act.  
Two opposite doctrines, the sole effects doctrine and the police powers doctrine, are 
seeking an answer for the question of when regulatory measures amount to expropriation. 
The sole effects doctrine defines the line between normal regulatory measures and regulatory 
measures amounting to expropriation through the depriving effect that the measure has on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Gazzini (2010), p. 50 and Zamir (2017), p. 320 
2 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, Award, para. 121 
3 Nikièma (2012), p. 3 and Zamir (2017), p. 320 
 2 
the investment. This doctrine draws the line between normal regulation and expropriation, 
by solely examining the effect that the government measure has on the investment. The 
police powers doctrine on the other hand does not agree that the effect should be the only 
factor considered, and therefore, emphasizes especially the meaning of a legitimate public 
purpose behind the regulatory measure when determining whether the state act is to be 
deemed expropriatory. Neither of the two doctrines is currently prevailing, and it is hard to 
predict which approach an investment tribunal will choose when confronted with the issue 
of regulatory expropriation.4 
The aim of this thesis is to answer the question of when regulatory measures amount to 
expropriation. This thesis will conclude that the appropriate way of determining the line 
when regulation amounts to expropriation is, by following the sole effects doctrine. I will 
execute a doctrinal study in order to argue that while the police powers doctrine might be 
more politically legitimate in the current climate, especially when the regulatory measure is 
connected to environmental concerns, it does not have sufficient legal support, and therefore, 
the sole effects doctrine finding firm legal support from the investment treaties shall prevail.  
 
     
1.2. Limitations and remarks 
 
1.2.1. Fragmentation of the treaty base 
 
A special feature of the international investment law is that it consists of large number of 
bilateral investment treaties5 and of a few multilateral treaties containing investment 
protection provisions.6 Because of the wide fragmentation of the treaty base, one must 
always keep in mind that each expropriation clause must be applied and interpreted in its 
own context and terms. Therefore, this thesis cannot give a certain one fits all answer. This 
does not, however, diminish the point of the general level examination that this thesis 
provides. It has been widely recognized among the scholars and in the arbitration practice 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Schill (2010), p. 110 
5!Day of the writing (1.9.2019) there are 2354 bilateral investment treaties into force according to 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements  
6!When referring to ‘investment treaties’ in this thesis, i will count in both bilateral investment 
treaties and multilateral treaties that not only concentrate on investment protection but contain a 
body of investment protection provisions such as NAFTA and CETA.!
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that the content of the expropriation clauses, and in general of investment treaties, is 
strikingly similar. It is also common in the investment arbitration practice that investment 
tribunals will refer to the rulings of other investment tribunals that have been faced with a 
similar clause but in a different investment treaty.7  
 
 
1.2.2. Concentration on the ‘representative’ expropriation clauses 
 
This thesis will concentrate on answering the question of when regulatory measures amount 
to expropriation regarding expropriation clauses that follow the prevalent model of 
expropriation clauses.8 As will be discussed in chapter nine, a new generation of 
expropriation clauses is evolving. The newer expropriation clauses are still rather rare, and 
the importance of the discussion of how the ‘older’ but still far more prevalent expropriation 
clauses should be applied cannot be overlooked. Finland, for example, has over 60 bilateral 
investment treaties in force today.9 The newest BITs were signed in 2009. These treaties 
signed in 2009 still do not represent the new generation.10 This would suggests that despite 
the fact that a newer generation of expropriation clauses is evolving the ‘older’ expropriation 
clauses remain prevalent.  
 
 
1.2.3. Concentration on the investment treaties 
 
This thesis will focus on the investment treaty sphere. Investment contracts concluded 
between a host state and a foreign investor regarding a specific investment are not discussed. 
If such contract has been concluded between an investor and  a host state, this agreement 
might contain additional clauses regarding expropriation. This thesis will solely concentrate 
on the scope of protection provided by the investment treaties concluded between two or 
more states. This thesis will also not be discussing the question of how to determine the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7!Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 286 !
8 More on the wordings of the prevalent expropriation clauses in chapter 3.4.1. 
9 https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/71/finland  
(day of the writing 1.9.2019) 
10!See Finland - Hong Kong, China SAR BIT (2009), Finland - Panama BIT (2009), and Finland - 
Nepal BIT (2009) 
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scope of indirect expropriation solely based on the norms of customary international law in 
a situation where there is no applicable investment treaty.  
 
 
1.2.4. Concentration on the cases with environmental connection 
 
Another important limitation is that this thesis will concentrate on the question of indirect 
expropriation in cases where the allegedly expropriatory act is connected to the public 
interest of protecting the environment. In other words, this thesis will concentrate on 
environmental regulatory expropriation. The focus on indirect expropriation cases that are 
connected to environmental concerns feels appropriate. The problem between environmental 
concerns and indirect expropriation is extremely timely and relevant. The need for effective 
action and stricter regulation regarding environmental matters has been acknowledged at a 
global level. States are facing increased pressure to take strict regulative action and have also 
shown to be readier than ever to enact new stricter regulations.11 On the other hand the desire 
to attract foreign investment has remained high, and the tension between the conflicting 
interests seems to be at an all time high.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11!See for example the ‘Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
OF THE COUNCIL on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment’ 
(2018/0172 (COD)) 
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2. Investor and Investment 
 
2.1. Introducing the terms 
 
In order to discuss more profoundly of the scope of protection that the expropriation clauses 
in the investment treaties provide, it is appropriate to shed some light into two intertwined 
terms: ‘investor’ and ‘investment’. These terms directly define the scope of protection, by 
determining who and what is protected. Expropriation clauses in the investment treaties 
protect foreign investors from direct and indirect expropriation of their investments.  
 
!
2.2. Investor   
 
The term investor determines who is protected from the expropriatory acts of a host state. 
All investment treaties provide their own definitions for the term investor. Generally two 
types of investors are recognized, natural persons and legal persons. Even though the 
international investment law is designed primarily to protect the activities of private 
investors, also government-controlled entities can be protected as long as they act in a 
commercial capacity. Whether non-profit organizations are protected as investors will 
depend on the nature of the activity concerned and of the definition that the specific treaty 
has adopted.12 Some investment treaties explicitly state that only investors operating in a 
commercial capacity will be protected while some treaties extent the protection to all legal 
persons “whether or not organized in pecuniary gain”.13 Unincorporated entities or 
groupings on the other hand are not generally protected as investors unless otherwise 
provided by a treaty.14  
Regarding the term investor, the main focus has not been in the determination of the 
actual term investor, but in the determination of the nationality of the investor. The question 
of nationality is a key interest in two regards. First, if an investor wants to rely on the 
protection provided by a bilateral or regional investment treaty, it must show that it has the 
nationality of one of the treaty parties. Second, if the investor wants to seek protection 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12!Dolzer & Schreuer  (2012), p. 44!
13 Argentina - Germany BIT (1991) Article 1(4) 
14!Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 47 
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through the ICSID Convention, it must show that it has the nationality of one of the ICSID 
member states. Therefore, the applicability of the material standards as well as the 
jurisdiction of an international tribunal are determined by the nationality of the investor.15 It 
is also  important to note that consequently the nationals of the host state are generally 
excluded from the protection that the investment treaties provide.16  
The nationality of a natural person is determined primarily according to the municipal 
legislation of the relevant state.17 A certificate of nationality granted by the state concerned 
is to be considered as strong evidence, but not always as a conclusive proof of nationality. 
In the case of dual nationality, tribunals have seen the doctrine of a genuine link, developed 
in the diplomatic protection context, inapplicable. The possibility of having two effective 
nationalities has been recognised in the practice.18 Some treaties like the ECT explicitly 
extend the protection not only to nationals, but also to permanent residents.19 
Determination of the nationality of a legal person is more problematic, but rather 
important considering that investors are in the majority of the cases corporations. National 
legal systems and investment treaties have adopted various ways of determining the 
nationality of corporations and other legal persons. Investment treaties can even adopt 
different definitions regarding how each contracting party will determine the nationality of 
legal persons. One of the two most used criteria is incorporation.20 The place of incorporation 
refers to the nationality of the state in which and under which laws the entity is incorporated. 
For example the ECT follows the incorporation criterion, and provides in the Article 
1(7)(a)(ii) that an entity shall be “organized in accordance with the law applicable in that 
Contracting Party”. The second of the two most used criteria is the place of the main seat of 
the business (‘siége social’).21 According to this criterion, a corporation has the nationality 
of the state where its effective management is situated. The two criteria, incorporation and 
the siége social, are sometimes also combined. For example, according to the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement Article 1(2) a company shall be “incorporated or 
constituted under the laws in force in the territory of any contracting party wherein the place 
of effective management is situated”. Some treaties go even further than these rather formal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 44-45 
16 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 46, and ICSID Article 25(2)(a) “does not include any person who 
on either date also had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute…” 
17 Wisner (2004), p. 928    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 46 
19 ECT article 1(7)(a)(i) 
20 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 47!
21 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 47!
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requirements of incorporation and siége social, by providing that there needs to be a genuine 
economic bond between the corporation and the state concerned. This would mean that an 
effective control of the entity by the nationals of the state, or alternatively a genuine 
economic activity in the state territory needs to be established.22 These  methods have partly 
been used to counteract unwanted treaty shopping.23 Another way that states have responded 
to treaty shopping is, by including a ‘denial of benefits’ clause in their treaties. A denial of 
benefits clause denies the benefits of the treaty to an entity incorporated in the state, but that 
has no real economic connection to the state.24  
Since host states may sometimes require that an investment shall be made through a 
locally incorporated company, some investment treaties (as well as the ICSID convention) 
provide that legal persons incorporated in the host state can be treated as foreign due to the 
foreign control.25 Normally, without this kind of clarification, legal persons incorporated in 
the host state would be excluded from the treaty protection.  
The position of shareholders as independent investors seeking protection under the 
investment treaties has provoked some discussion. International law has, however, accepted 
the right of the shareholders to bring claims independent of the corporation.26 Nowadays 
investment treaties also often include a reference to shares, shareholding, or participation in 
corporations when defining what they consider as investments. This assures the position of 
the shareholders as investors capable of bringing independent claims against a host state. As 
a general rule, the size of the investment bears no relevance. The shareholder does not have 
to be a majority shareholder in order to be regarded as an investor. Only the fact that an 
investment has been made bears relevance.27 
 
!
!
!
!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 49 
23 There has been already evidence of corporations starting to treaty shop. For example the big U.S. 
corporations, GE and Bechtel have tried to overcome the lack of BIT between India and the United 
States by relying on the Indian-Mauritius BIT through their Mauritian subsidiaries. Wisner (2004), 
p. 944 
24 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 55, and the ECT Article 17(1) 
25 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p.51-55 
26 Muchlinski, Ortino, & Schreuer (2008), p. 81-82 
27 Muchlinski, Ortino, & Schreuer (2008), p. 82-86 
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2.3. Investment 
!
2.3.1. The broad concept of investment 
 
Expropriation clauses in the investment treaties protect against an expropriation of an 
investment. An investment is the object of the protection. By determining the scope of the 
term investment, one determines what objects are possibly protected from the expropriatory 
acts of the host state. Broadening the conception of an investment, automatically broadens 
the notion of expropriatory action.28 The increasing and ever changing concept of property 
rights brings an additional problematic to the discussion of the scope of indirect 
expropriation.29 
As for the term investor, investment treaties usually provide a definition for the term 
investment. While the national foreign investment laws tend to lean towards transaction or 
enterprise-based approaches,30 the majority of the investment treaties tend to side with  more 
broader asset-based definitions. The asset-based definitions usually include a list of assets 
and investment types that are protected. Most bilateral investment treaties follow a model 
that contains a general phrase that defines the term investment containing broadly ‘all assets’ 
accompanied by an illustrative list of categories, while some treaties have opted for a 
narrower definition, by providing an exhaustive list of the types of assets that are protected 
as investments.31 
Investment treaties tend to also include the legality of an investment as a part of the 
definitions. Bilateral investment treaties often define the investment as “in accordance with 
host state laws and regulations”.32 This means that only investments that are made in 
accordance with the national legislation of the host state may enjoy the protection that the 
treaty provides. It is, however, questionable if this legality requirement should be understood 
only as referring to the material legality of an investment, or if  it also requires processual 
legality.33  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 AlQurashi (2004), p. 901 
29 AlQurashi (2004), p. 903 and Douglas, Pauwelyn & Viñuales (2014), p. 365-366 
30 In the transaction-based model the target of the protection is the underlining capital transfer 
rather than the assets of the investor. The enterprise-based model on the other hand protects the 
business organization of the investment. Muchlinski, Ortino, & Schreuer (2008), p. 52 
31!Muchlinski, Ortino, & Schreuer (2008), p. 57-58!
32 For example Argentina-Germany BIT Article 1(1) , Albania-Spain BIT Article 1(2) and Finland 
- Ukraine BIT (1992) Article 1(1) 
33 See more about the differentiation between material and processual legality of an investment: 
Kulick (2012), p. 332-335 
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A key feature of the investment treaties is that they are designed to protect foreign 
investments. The foreignness of the investment is determined by the nationality of the 
investor which has been discussed above. Therefore, the actual origin of the capital is not a 
decisive factor on this regard.  
Some investment treaties explicitly state that only investments in the territory of the host 
state are protected. This statement has been understood as a requirement of certain physical 
presence of the investment in the territory of a host state. Investment tribunals have adopted 
a rather strict  approach on this matter in cases of physical businesses in comparicon to cases 
involving for instance financial instruments.34 
As with the term investor, the term investment is also important when determining the 
jurisdiction of the ICSID. The Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention ties the jurisdiction of 
the Centre “to any legal dispute arising out of an investment”. It is, however, been stated in 
the arbitration practice that the term investment in the investment treaties could possibly 
receive a different interpretation than what shall be given to the term when determining the 
jurisdiction according to the ICSID Convention.35 Since the topic of this thesis concentrates 
on the material protection clauses of the investment treaties, the determination of the term 
investment for a jurisdictional purpose is not that necessary, and therefore, will not be 
discussed any further. 
 
 
2.3.2. Contracts as investments 
 
It is rather usual that big investment decisions are accompanied by specific investment 
contracts between an investor and a host state. In these contracts the investor and the host 
state can agree on more specific issues and in a further reaching manner. These contracts 
usually cover issues like taxation, customs regulations, and pricing issues. Also stabilization 
clauses are commonly included in these agreements.36 By laying down the important legal 
and financial foundation for the possible investment, these contracts have a fundamental 
weight in the making of the business decision of investing. Because of the practical 
importance of these contracts, almost all modern investment treaties provide that also 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 76-78!!
35!Muchlinski, Ortino, & Schreuer (2008), p. 62-64!
36 More on stabilisation clauses Brabandere, & Gazzini (2012), p. 221-222 
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contracts are included in the term investment, and therefore, protected by the treaty 
standards.37     
As investments, contracts are also protected from the expropriatory acts of a host state, 
and the idea, that contractual rights can be expropriated, is widely accepted by legal scholars 
and the arbitration practice.38 However, it is essential to note that not every failure to perform 
a contract shall be considered constituting an expropriation even when the breach of the 
contract leads to a loss of rights under the contract. In order to distinguish between a normal 
breach of a contract and an expropriation, tribunals have looked into whether the state acted 
in an official, governmental capacity when breaching the contract. Only when a state is 
acting in an official capacity when breaching the contract, expropriation may be deemed to 
have occurred.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 126-129!
38 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, Award, para 440 
39 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 126-129; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of 
Tanzania, Award, para 458:  “Rather, the critical distinction is between situations in which a State 
acts merely as a contractual partner, and cases in which it acts “iure imperi”, exercising elements of 
its governmental authority. These are often termed “actes de puissance publique”, where the use by 
the State of its public prerogatives or imperium is involved in the actions complained of.”  and 
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, Award, para 443: “First, a breach of an 
agreement will amount to an expropriation only if the State acted not only in its capacity of party to 
the agreement, but also in its capacity of sovereign authority, that is to say using its sovereign 
power.”  
!
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3. Expropriation 
 
3.1. The sovereign right to expropriate  
 
Even though the expropriation clauses in the investment treaties are written in a prohibitive 
manner, they do not actually prohibit states to take expropriatory action. As a part of the 
notion of territorial sovereignty, the inherent right of the state to expropriate alien property 
on its territory has been recognized and accepted. Since the right of the state to take 
expropriatory action is such a fundamental right, even the modern investment treaties respect 
it.40 Investment treaties, however, lay down requirements that need to be fulfilled in order 
for the expropriatory act to be considered lawful.41 Even though the state’s right to take 
regulatory action constituting expropriation is not prohibited, a state might feel that 
investment treaties lay down such heavy requirements for a lawful expropriation that its 
sovereign right to take expropriatory action is in practice affected. The risk of high 
compensation connected to indirect expropriations has sometimes led to question whether 
investment treaties can possibly cause a regulatory chill especially regarding environmental 
matters.42 
 
 
3.2. Lawful expropriation 
 
3.2.1. Criteria for lawful expropriation 
 
As stated above international investment treaties do not prohibit direct or indirect 
expropriation. Instead they set requirements that shall be met in order for the expropriation 
to be considered lawful. According to the Article 13(1) of the ECT:  
 
“Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting Party 
shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as "Expropriation") 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40!Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 98!
41 Nikièma (2012), p. 3 !
42!Freeman (2003), p. 181 and Bungenberg, Griebel, & Hindelang (2011) p. 150 !
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except where such Expropriation is: 
(a) for a purpose which is in the public interest; 
(b) not discriminatory; 
(c) carried out under due process of law; and 
(d) accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.” 
 
Most of the modern investment treaties contain the same three (or four) requirements.43 First 
of these requirements regards the public purpose. Expropriation should always serve a 
purpose of pubic interest in order to be lawful. The notion of public interest has a broad 
meaning, and it is often seen appropriate to give the states quite a bit of discretion to decide 
how they want to determine public interest.44 It is, however, not unseen that an investment 
tribunal addresses the significance and limits of this requirement.45 According to the second 
requirement, the expropriatory measure shall not be arbitrary or discriminatory. The third 
possible requirement provides that the expropriatory measure must follow the rules of due 
process. This requirement is not always counted in since it repeats the minimum standard 
under customary international law, and is also part of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard.46  The fourth and most feared requirement is compensation. Expropriation must 
always be accompanied by a prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. The fair market 
value of the expropriated investment is nowadays understood generally as adequate.47  
It is notable that the requirement of compensation is a so called either-or requirement. 
If expropriation has occurred, the investor is according to the text of the treaty entitled for 
full compensation (the fair market value of the investment). Correspondingly, if concluded 
that expropriation has not occurred, the investor is entitled to no compensation at all. 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43!López (2014) p. 117!
44!Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 99 and López (2014) p. 125 and 134!
45 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. The Republic of Hungary, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, para 429-433 
46!Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 99-100!
47According to the Article 13(1) of the ECT: “Such compensation shall amount to the fair market 
value of the Investment expropriated at the time immediately before the Expropriation or 
impending Expropriation became known in such a way as to affect the value of the Investment 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Valuation Date").” and  López (2014) p. 118 
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3.2.2. Unlawful expropriation 
 
If one or more of the three (or four) requirements of lawful expropriation are not met, the 
expropriation is deemed unlawful. The significance of determining whether or not the 
expropriation is lawful lies in the standard of compensation. In the case of lawful 
expropriation, the investor is entitled for adequate compensation as the expropriation clauses 
provide. However, in the case of unlawful expropriation, the investor is entitled to reparation  
according to the rules of customary international law. In the case of unlawful expropriation, 
the investor is entitled not only to ‘compensation’ but to ‘reparation’ which includes losses, 
lost profits and indirect damages.48 
 
 
3.3. Direct expropriation 
 
In direct expropriation, the owner is deprived of his legal title of the property. Because direct 
expropriation requires a legal transfer of a title, it is quite unproblematic to determine 
whether a direct expropriation has happened. Direct expropriation can be established by 
examining the existence of the legal rights to the property. States have, however, become 
more and more reluctant to directly expropriate alien property. One reason being that they 
want to avoid the negative publicity that a direct taking would bring, and therefore, affect 
negatively the state’s reputation as a venue for foreign investment.49 Partly due to these 
reasons, the focus of the international investment law has shifted towards the problematic 
surrounding indirect expropriations.50 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Nikièma (2013), p. 2-3.The compensation standard for unlawful expropriation was expressed by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzów Factory Case (Germany/Poland), 
September 13, 1928 : “Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the 
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had 
not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding 
to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss 
sustained which would not be covered by the restitution in kind or payment in place of it—such are 
the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary 
to international law.” 
49 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 101 
50 AlQurashi (2004), p. 897 
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3.4. Indirect expropriation 
 
3.4.1. The concept of indirect expropriation 
 
Aside with direct expropriation, most of the investment treaties provide protection against 
indirect expropriation.51 In an indirect expropriation, also referred as de facto expropriation, 
no legal transfer of a title of the ownership takes place. In the case of indirect expropriation, 
the investor still remains as the legal owner of the property. The act of indirect expropriation, 
however, deprives the investor of the possibility of utilizing the property in a meaningful 
way. Indirect expropriation in general covers measures that have the effect of direct 
expropriation in other words an effect of total or near total deprivation of the investment.52 
Therefore, an indirect expropriation has the effect of a  direct expropriation without the legal 
transfer of a title. The effect amounting to expropriation has been described in the practice 
by stating:  
 
“The required level of interference with rights has been variously described as 
“unreasonable”; “an interference that renders rights so useless that they must be deemed to 
have been expropriated”; “an interference that deprives the investor of fundamental rights of 
ownership”; “an interference that makes rights practically useless”; “an interference 
sufficiently restrictive to warrant a conclusion that the property has been ‘taken’”; “an 
interference that makes any form of exploitation of the property disappear”; “an interference 
such that the property can no longer be put to reasonable use.”53 
 
Since the existence of an indirect expropriation does not flow from a legal transfer of a title 
or from another other easily recognisable act, states are often keen to deny the existence of 
an indirect expropriation in order to avoid the obligation of paying high amount of 
compensation.   
Expropriation clauses can be divided into two main categories according to the 
terminology used regarding indirect expropriations. The first more common type of clauses 
distinguishes between direct expropriation or nationalisation and indirect expropriation or 
equivalent measure or measures with equivalent/similar effects. Expropriation clauses in this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Nikièma (2012), p. 5 
52!Zamir (2017), p. 319 
53 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, Award, para 463 
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category use just one of the above mentioned expressions of indirect expropriation excluding 
the other two.54  Clauses of this category use following formations: 
-! “measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation”55 
-! “subjected to any other measure the effects of which would be tantamount to 
expropriation or nationalization”56 
-! “expropriate nationalize or take similar measures”57  
-! “nationalise, expropriate or subject to measures having effect equivalent to 
nationalisation or expropriation”58 
-! “shall take any measure depriving, directly or indirectly”59 
The second type of expropriation clauses distinguishes between three types of expropriation 
including direct expropriation, indirect expropriation and equivalent measures/measures 
with similar/equivalent effects. Treaties signed by North American and Latin American 
countries as well as Switzerland use this kind of terminology. 60 Clauses of this category use 
following formations: 
-! “directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of 
another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or 
expropriation”61  
-! “shall take, either directly or indirectly, measures of expropriation, nationalization or 
any other measures having the same nature or the same effect against investments”62 
These type of formations have begged the question of the difference between an indirect 
expropriation and a measure with equivalent effects. The investment tribunals have, 
however, seen the two expressions “indirect expropriation” and “measures with equivalent 
effects” as initially covering the same concept.63  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Nikièma (2012), p. 5  
55 For example Czech Republic - Hungary BIT (1993) Article 5(1) 
56 For example Germany - Poland BIT (1989) Article 4(2) 
57 For example China - Romania BIT (1994) Article 4 
58 For example Australia - Romania BIT (1993) Article 5(1) and similary Finland - India BIT 
(2002) Article 5(1)!
59 For example Norway - Chile BIT (1993) Article 6(1) 
60 Nikièma (2012), p. 6!
61 For example NAFTA Article 1110 (1) 
62 For example Kenya - Switzerland BIT (2006) Article 6(1) 
63 Nikièma (2012), p. 6 and!S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial 
Award, para 286: “The Tribunal agrees with the conclusion in the Interim Award of the Pope & 
Talbot Arbitral Tribunal that something that is “equivalent” to something else cannot logically 
encompass more. In common with the Pope & Talbot Tribunal, this Tribunal considers that the 
drafters of the NAFTA intended the word “tantamount” to embrace the concept of so-called 
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3.4.2. Control and deprivation of the economic value of the investment 
 
Control of the investment is an important factor in the determination of whether an indirect 
expropriation has occurred. If the investor is deprived of the control of the investment, it 
strongly militates that an indirect expropriation has occurred. However, the fact that the  
investor remains in the control of the investment is not to be seen as conclusive proof that 
an indirect expropriation has not happened. Even if the investor is not deprived of the control 
of the investment, but the government measure substantially deprives the economic value of 
the investment, an indirect expropriation has occurred.64 
 
 
3.4.3. Duration of the measure 
 
The duration of the measure and the duration of the effect of the measure affecting the 
interests of the investor are essential factors when determining whether an indirect 
expropriation has occurred.65 Even when the government measure deprives the economic 
benefit of the investment, if the depriving effect is only temporary, no expropriation has 
occurred. Expropriation generally requires a lasting or permanent deprivation of the 
investment. In the case of S.D. Myers v. Canada, the tribunal concluded that: 
 
“An expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to make 
use of its economic rights although it may be that, in some contexts and circumstances, it 
would be appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to an expropriation, even if it were 
partial or temporary.”66 
 
Naturally, it is challenging to define a certain time period for how long the duration of the 
measure must last in order for it to be considered ‘lasting’ or ‘permanent’. Application of 
this criterion requires a case-by-case approach, and will depend highly on the circumstances 
of a particular case. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“creeping expropriation”, rather than to expand the internationally accepted scope of the term 
expropriation.” 
64!Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 117-118 
65 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 124 
66!S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para 283!
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3.4.4. Legitimate expectations 
 
Legitimate expectations of an investor are an important aspect of property protection, and 
have recently received increasing attention in the investment practice.67 More traditionally 
legitimate expectations have played an essential part in the interpretation of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. Legitimate expectations have, however, also entered the sphere 
of indirect expropriation, and investment tribunals have concluded that the disappointment 
of legitimate expectations can play an important part in the determination of whether an 
indirect expropriation has occurred.68 The concept of legitimate expectations is rather 
general in nature, and it is hard to draw mechanical conclusions from it. The legal framework 
of the host state at the time of the investment is one important source of investor 
expectations.69 For the purpose of expropriation claims, investment tribunals have held a 
rather high threshold regarding legitimate investor expectations. In a case where the investor 
is not given special assurances by the host state, or if the investor is engaged in a particularly 
high-risk market, expectations are seen as less legitimate. The high threshold of legitimate 
expectations applied in regard to expropriation claims does not, however, exclude the 
possibility that the same expectations may play a role when applying other investment 
protection standards like the requirement of fair and equitable treatment.70 
 
!
3.4.5. Omissions constituting an indirect expropriation 
 
It remains controversial whether indirect expropriation can result solely from omissions of 
a host state. Some tribunals have explicitly stated that expropriation always requires some 
kind of action, and therefore, omissions alone cannot constitute expropriation. Other 
investment tribunals have on the other hand endorsed the idea that whether or not the 
deprivation of the investment is due to omissions or acts makes no difference.71 However, 
the circumstances in which an investor would be deprived of his investment due to omissions 
alone are in practice rare. The problematic of whether an omissions alone can constitute 
expropriation is also not that relevant in the context of this thesis considering that this thesis 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67!Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 115!!
68!Muchlinski, Ortino, & Schreuer (2008),  p. 448-449!!
69 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 115!!
70!Muchlinski, Ortino, & Schreuer (2008), p. 448-449!
71!Muchlinski, Ortino, & Schreuer (2008), p. 431-432!
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concentrates on the problematic of indirect expropriations that are connected to regulatory 
measures that a state has taken with regards to environmental concerns.  
 
 
3.4.6. Regulatory expropriation 
 
An indirect expropriation, that is caused by a regulative act of a state, is at times referred to 
as regulatory expropriation or regulatory taking. In other words, regulatory expropriation 
occurs when a regulatory act of the state diminishes the value of the investment to such an 
extent that the act is to be deemed expropriatory. The effect of the regulatory act upon the 
economic benefit and the value of the investment together with the effect upon the control 
of the investment are also key factors when determining whether the regulatory measures 
shall be deemed constituting indirect expropriation.72 As stated at the beginning of this 
thesis, it remains, however, controversial in both practice and in academy writings whether 
the effect of the regulatory measure shall be the only determinative factor, or should other 
factors like the purpose and the character of the regulatory act be taken into account.  
 
 
3.5. Creeping expropriation 
  
The term creeping expropriation describes a situation where an expropriation (direct or 
indirect) results from a cumulated series of acts and/or omissions that lead to the same end 
result as an expropriation resulting from a single decisive act. The idea of cumulative effect 
constituting an expropriation reflects the Article 15(1) of the ILC’s Articles on State 
Responsibility.73 According to the Article 15(1):   
 
“The breach of an international obligation by a State through a series of actions or omissions 
defined in aggregate as wrongful occurs when the action or omission occurs which, taken 
with the other actions or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful act.”  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72!Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), p. 112!!
73 Crystallex International Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/11/2, Award,  para. 669 
 19 
This suggests that indirect expropriation may result from different regulatory measures taken 
together in a certain limited period of time that cumulatively have the effect of 
expropriation.74 In the case of  Biwater v. Tanzania, the investment tribunal endorsed the 
concept of creeping expropriation by stating that: 
 
“In terms of what might qualify as “expropriation”, the Arbitral Tribunal accepts BGT’s 
submission that it must consider the Republic’s conduct both in terms of the effect of 
individual, isolated, acts complained of, as well as in terms of the cumulative effect of a 
series of individual and connected acts, in so far as such a cumulative effect might be to 
deprive the investor in whole or in material part of the use or economic benefit of its assets.”75 
 
 
 
 
 
!
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!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 AlQurashi (2004), p. 900 !
75 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, Award, para 455 
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4. The two doctrines 
!
In the arbitration practice two main doctrines have evolved in order to determine when 
regulatory measures may amount to expropriation. These doctrines are the sole effects 
doctrine and the police powers doctrine. In this chapter I will introduce these two doctrines. 
 
 
4.1. The sole effects doctrine 
 
The sole effects doctrine determines the existence of an indirect expropriation, by solely 
examining the effect that a government measure has on the investment.76 The rationale 
follows that if the government measure has the same depriving effect as in the case of direct 
expropriation, indirect expropriation has occurred. The sole effects doctrine finds its support 
from the wordings of the expropriation clauses. Many expropriation clauses expressly state 
that the state measure is to be deemed expropriatory due to its effects. These clauses use 
terms like  “having the same effect” or “having a similar effect”.77 One example being the 
Article 13 of the ECT stating that: ”Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the 
Area of any other Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to a 
measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation”. 
Following the wordings of these clauses, the determinative factor seems to be quite evidently 
the effect of the measure. The use of these terms can be seen as a clear indication designed 
to assist the interpretation of the international tribunals.78  
The sole effects doctrine disregards all the other parameters in the determination, and 
therefore, is an exclusive criterion. The damage suffered by the investor is the only factor 
that counts when determining whether an indirect expropriation has occurred also in a case 
where the depriving effect is caused by a general regulatory measure.79 It is important to 
note that even though the sole effects doctrine concentrates on only to the effect of the 
measure, it does not deny the existence of the police powers of a state per se. It does 
recognize that not all regulatory measures that have a negative effect on the investment 
amount to an expropriation. In the light of the sole effects doctrine, general measures falling 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 Dolzer (2002-2003), p. 79 
77 See more on the used wordings in chapter 3.4.1. 
78 Nikièma (2012), p. 6 
79 Nikièma (2012), p.13!!
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in the police powers of the state consist of measures that do not deprive the economic value 
of the investment. Therefore, where a regulatory measure (or series measures) sufficiently 
deprives the value of the investment, the measure is deemed expropriatory, and is not seen 
as a legitimate use of the police powers.80  
The challenge of applying the sole effects doctrine lies in quantifying the threshold of 
the economic impact.81 In their rulings, investment tribunals have used the threshold of 
serious and irreversible damage caused to the investment. The terms “substantial”, “serious” 
and “severe” are used to describe the severity of the damage suffered. The investment must, 
therefore, have lost all or near all economic interest for the investor.82 Therefore, regulations 
that have adverse effects on the investment, but do not rise to this high threshold shall not 
be deemed expropriatory. This thesis does not even try to provide an answer to the question 
of the precise level of interference that shall be met in order for the act to be considered 
expropriatory. When determining where to exactly draw the line of the level of deprivation 
required, the common law method of fact sensitive case-by-case development might be the 
most practical method of legal development. 
 
 
4.2. The police powers doctrine 
 
According to the police powers doctrine, a state measure that falls within the accepted police 
powers of the state does not constitute an indirect taking, and the state does not have the 
obligation to pay compensation even though the measure would lead to deprivation of the 
investor’s property. The police powers doctrine is often referred by stating that “a non-
discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due 
process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed 
expropriatory and compensable”.83 The notion of police powers has roots in both common 
law and civil law systems, and it claims to find its legal support from the norms of customary 
international law. Even though the police powers doctrine was already recognized at the end 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Fortier & Stephen (2005), p. 85 and 93   
81 Gazzini (2010), p.38. Some investment tribunals have also concluded that deprivation might 
occur even if no loss of economic value has occurred, see Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United 
Republic of Tanzania, Award, para 464 
82 Nikièma (2012), p. 14 
83 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award, para 7 Part IV - 
Chapter D !!
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of the nineteenth century, and the beginning of the twentieth century by scholars and legal 
practitioners,84 still to this day its scope and applicability in the context of expropriation 
claims remains uncertain. The two main interpretations of the police powers doctrine 
regarding indirect expropriation differ on whether all regulatory measures taken in public 
purpose shall be excluded from the scope of indirect expropriation, or only measures 
connected to the maintenance of health, moral and public order should be excluded.85  
The criteria that the police powers doctrine uses when determining the existence of 
indirect expropriation consists of three cumulative factors. These factors are the legitimate 
public purpose of the measure, the non-discriminatory nature of the measure, and the 
compliance with the due process when enacting the measure.86 One of the biggest obstacles 
of the police powers doctrine is connected to these factors that are to be used to determine 
whether a state measure is deemed expropriatory. The problem lies in the fact that the 
investment treaties explicitly use the same factors when determining the legality of an 
expropriation. Understandably using the legality criteria to construct that an expropriation 
has not occurred creates tension between the treaty clauses and the police powers doctrine, 
and is, therefore, highly controversial. 
Before taking a closer look at how these two doctrines have been applied in the practice 
of investment tribunals, I will discuss shortly about the interpretation of investment treaties 
and the notion of conflict of norms in the next two chapters.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 Zamir (2017), p. 326-328  
85 Zamir (2017), p. 327!
86!Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award, para 1-28 Part II 
- Chapter D!
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5. The interpretation of the investment treaties 
 
5.1. The rules of treaty interpretation 
 
Even though the interpretation of treaties is no exact science, it is subject to certain rules.87  
The question of the scope of indirect expropriation in the investment treaty sphere is 
essentially  a question of treaty interpretation. There are clauses regarding expropriation  in 
the investment treaties, and what this thesis aims to find out is how these clauses should be 
interpreted and applied in the practice. Despite their special features, investment treaties are 
international agreements concluded between states in a written form and governed by 
international law as the Article 2(1)(a) of the VCLT provides. Therefore, also the rules of 
treaty interpretation are applicable. According to the rules of interpretation laid down in the 
Article 31 of the VCLT: 
 
 ”1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties 
so intended.” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Crawford (2012), p. 378 and Yen (2014), p. 102 
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The general rule of interpretation expressed in the Article 31 has been seen also as a 
reflection of customary international law.88 The general rule of interpretation is supported 
by the supplementary means of interpretation. According to the Article 32 of the VCLT:  
 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 : 
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”   
 
Applicability of these rules in the investment treaty sphere might seem obvious, however, 
investment tribunals have rather often forgotten to acknowledge and carefully apply them in 
their rulings. As Yen has argued, investment tribunals have systematically neglected to 
acknowledge and apply the general rules of interpretation laid down in the VCLT. According 
to a review of 229 investment arbitration cases, a substantial number of the investment 
tribunals seem to forget to even mention the relevant articles of the VCLT, and many of the 
ones that do indeed mention the rules of treaty interpretation do not end up applying them 
appropriately in their rulings.89 As Yen argues, the rules expressed in the Article 31 and 32 
of the VCLT should be applied also in the investment arbitrations when a tribunal is applying 
and interpreting an investment treaty. 
     
   
5.2. The principle of restrictive interpretation  
 
The Permanent Court has in some cases expressed a principle of interpretation providing that 
clauses implying limitations to the state sovereignty shall be interpreted in a restrictive 
manner or in other words restrictions upon the sovereignty shall not be presumed.90 This 
principle is not codified in the VCLT, and its position as a general principle of international 
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law is not secured. According to Lauterpatch, the principle of restrictive interpretation has 
been discouraged, and the occasional endorsement it has received has been rather nominal.91  
 
 
5.3. Pacta sunt servanda and the Article 27 of the VCLT 
 
The VCLT also expresses the principle of pacta sunt servanda. According to the Article 26 
of the VCLT: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed 
by them in good faith.” This Article lays down the almost too obvious rule that once the  
treaty (including investment treaties) has entered into force parties are obliged to perform 
the treaty obligations in good faith. Therefore, pacta sunt servanda provides a high threshold 
for application for instance customary international law norms contradicting the treaty 
obligations. The principle of pacta sunt servanda has also achieved the status of a general 
principle of international law.92  
The Article 26 is accompanied by the following Article 27 of the VCLT providing that 
“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty”. The Article 27 expresses the fundamental rule of the law of state 
responsibility concluding that a state cannot escape its international responsibility, by 
referring to its domestic legal situation. Therefore, this Article excludes the use of internal 
law as a defence in an international dispute settlement procedure.93 The importance of this 
provision in the investment treaty context especially regarding regulatory expropriations is 
that a state cannot use the legitimacy of its internal regulations as a defence against 
expropriation claims.   
 
 
!
!
!
!
!
!
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6. Conflict of norms? 
 
One might consider approaching the tension between the investment protection and the 
public interest as an issue of conflict of norms. In this light, the norms regarding indirect 
expropriation would be seen conflicting with the international norms requiring the state to 
regulate in the public interest.94 However, when taking a closer look, actual conflict between 
norms hardly exists in a case of indirect expropriation. According to the prevailing view in 
the academic writings on international law, a conflict between norms arises when a party 
cannot simultaneously comply with both norms.95 If agreeing with this concept of conflict 
of norms, there is no conflict to be found between an expropriation clause, and an 
international law norm requiring states to regulate in the public interest. The expropriation 
clauses in the investment treaties, as stated before, do not prohibit expropriation, direct or 
indirect. This means that the host state is allowed to take action in the public interest and 
fulfill its international obligations. It is completely possible for the state to fulfill both 
obligations simultaneously. 
Expropriation clauses only lay down requirements for lawful expropriation. The states 
usually do not have a problem with the requirements of public purpose,  non-discrimination, 
and due process. What the states do have a problem with is the requirement of  adequate 
compensation. However, the fact that a state has agreed to give adequate compensation when 
directly or indirectly taking the property of foreign investors does not in any way create a 
conflict between the expropriation clause and an international norm requiring the state to 
regulate in the public interest. Since no conflict of norms really exists, arguments relying on 
the idea of conflicting norms shall not be seen relevant or applicable. Solely the fact that 
fulfillment of one obligation makes it monetary costlier to fulfill another obligation does not 
mean that a legal conflict between norms exists. If one dares to argue that a treaty obligations 
shall be interpreted in a way that leads to the most monetarily affordable result for the host 
state, one ignores the basic principles that the international legal system is based on. 
International environmental law treaties rarely play an essential role in the reasonings 
of investment tribunals. As a general trend investment tribunals have been reluctant to refer 
to the instruments of international environmental law. Consideration and acknowledgement 
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of soft law instruments and the evolving principles of international environmental law are 
rather non existing. This portrays the general hesitancy of the investment tribunals to refer 
non-investment treaties in their reasonings regarding expropriations.96 When accepting the 
rationale that there is no conflict between expropriation clauses requiring compensation and 
international norms requiring states to take regulative action, it also becomes understandable 
why many investment tribunals have been hesitant to refer to other international legal 
instruments. The reason might as well be that those other international legal instruments are 
not relevant especially when applying expropriation clauses. This will be also the reason 
why in this thesis, I will not refer to international law instruments regarding environmental 
matters when discussing the scope of indirect expropriation.  
One should also note that international norms regarding environmental protection are 
still rather vague. The development of international environmental law is characterized by 
the evolution of standard-setting conventions. These conventions create international 
environmental regimes providing structure and resources for addressing environmental 
issues rather than a set of specific obligations that the state parties have to follow.97  
Therefore,  states still have a lot of room to decide how they want to achieve the set goals 
regarding environmental protection without violating their international obligations 
regarding investment protection. 
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7. Case law analysis 
 
7.1. Intro to the case law analysis 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the investment tribunals have answered the 
question of indirect expropriation in cases where the expropriation claim was connected to 
regulatory measures taken with regard to environmental concerns. This case law analysis 
will concentrate especially on the following four questions:  
1.! How did the tribunal define the term indirect expropriation? 
2.! How did the tribunal initially examine the existence of indirect expropriation? 
3.! What meaning and weight were given to the public interest and the possible 
international obligation of the state to protect the environment? 
4.! What is the role and systematical placement of the police powers doctrine? 
 
The aim of this kind of examination of the case law is to conclude that first, investment 
tribunals tend to determine the term indirect expropriation only, by referring to the effect 
that a measure has on the investment. Second, the initial way of determining the existence 
of an indirect expropriation is done by examining the effect that a government measure has 
on the investment. As to the weight given to the public interest no unified opinion exists in 
the practice. And finally, the systematic placement of the police powers doctrine together 
with the observations to the questions 1 and 2 indicates that the police powers doctrine is a 
possible exception criterion to the treaty obligation. 
 
 
7.2. Santa Elena v. Costa Rica 
 
The investment arbitration case Santa Elena v. Costa Rica was one of the first cases where 
the host state raised environmental public interest concerns, and referred to its international 
obligation to preserve the environment in the context of expropriation claims. This case did 
not directly discuss about the scope of indirect expropriation. In its reasoning the tribunal 
did, however, address the question of what meaning shall be given to the fact that a 
government measure was taken in the public interest relating to environmental concerns. 
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Compania ́ del Desarrollo de Santa Elena (CDSE) purchased a property in Costa Rica 
in order to develop a tourist resort and a residential community. The majority of the 
company’s shareholders where nationals of the United States of America. The government 
of the Costa Rica  later issued a decree expropriating the property of the CDSE. CDSE 
accepted the expropriation, but contested the amount of compensation it was offered by the 
government of the Costa Rica.98 In its reasoning regarding the expropriation claim, the 
tribunal refused to give any weight to the public interest of preserving the environment. The 
tribunal highlighted that the public interest behind the expropriatory act shall not affect the 
legal assessment of an expropriatory measure nor the obligation to pay compensation. 
According to the tribunal: 
 
“While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a taking 
for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property was taken for this 
reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for 
the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property was 
taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate compensation must 
be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect the environment makes no 
difference.”99 
 
The Santa Elena tribunal was quite fast to disregard the environmental public interest 
arguments provided by Costa Rica. Also the fact that Costa Rica expropriated the property 
in order to fulfill its international law obligation to preserve the environment was given no 
weight. 
 
 
7.3. Metalclad v. Mexico 
 
The case of Metalclad v. Mexico was the first case to confront the delicate issue of waste 
disposal and the construction and operation of landfills. A Mexican company Confinamiento 
Tecnico de Residuos Industriales SA de CV (COTERIN) was granted a permit by the federal 
government of Mexico to construct and operate a transfer station and  a landfill for hazardous 
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waste in the region of San Luis Potosi (SLP).100 After receiving the permit, a U.S. 
corporation Metalclad purchased COTERIN with all its licenses.101 After the purchase, the 
municipal government of SLP allegedly begin to take action in order to prevent the operation 
of the landfill.102 The federal government of Mexico, however, continued to assure Metalclad  
that it was entitled to construct and operate the landfill.103 Once the landfill began to operate, 
demonstrations opposing the operation of the landfill blocked the site of the landfill, and 
therefore, Metalclad was effectively prevented from operating the landfill.104 After 
negotiations, the federal government of Mexico entered into a Convenio with the Metalclad 
permitting the operation of the landfill. The municipal government of the SLP, however, still 
refused to grant Metalclad a municipal permit for the operation of the landfill, and later 
issued an Ecological Decree that declared a Natural Area for the protection of a rare cactus.  
This Natural Area overlapped with the area of the landfill, and therefore, Metalclad was 
effectively and permanently precluded from operating the landfill.105 Due to the acts of the 
municipal authorities and the issuance of the Ecological Decree, Metalclad claimed that the 
Respondent had indirectly expropriated its investment.  
The Metalclad tribunal defined indirect expropriation by referring to the effect of the 
measure and stated that expropriation under NAFTA includes also: 
 
“-- covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving 
the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic 
benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State”106 
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Accordingly, the tribunal initially examined the existence of indirect expropriation, by 
examining the effect that the government conduct had on the investment, and came into the 
conclusion that the investment of the Metalclad was expropriated.107 
As to the weight that shall be given to the public interest behind the measure the tribunal 
stated that: 
 
“The Tribunal need not decide or consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of the 
Ecological Decree. --  However, the Tribunal considers that the implementation of the 
Ecological Decree would, in and of itself, constitute an act tantamount to expropriation.”108   
 
The tribunal refused to consider the legitimate motivation or intent behind the issuance of 
the Ecological Decree. Therefore, the tribunal denied the idea that the intent or motive behind 
a regulatory act could have any meaning when determining whether an indirect expropriation 
has occurred. Only the fact, that the issuance of the said Decree had the effect of depriving 
the investor of the economic benefit of the property, was considered decisive. 
 
 
7.4. Biwater v. Tanzania 
 
The case of Biwater v. Tanzania concentrated on the issues relating to water and sewer 
infrastructures. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited made a bid, and got the right to develop 
a water and sewer infrastructure and services project in Tanzania. Biwater formed a 
company, City Water, to execute the project. City Water entered into contracts governing 
the projects with the government Water and Sewerage Authority. The City Water, however, 
was confronted with financial and practical difficulties that prevented it from meeting the 
set performance guarantees. Tanzania decided to terminate the project contract, and deport 
the senior management of the City Water. New management was ordered to take control of 
the assets of the company.109 According to Biwater Tanzania had indirectly expropriated its 
investment due to the acts described above.   
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The Biwater tribunal defined indirect expropriation also by referring to the effect and 
stated that: 
 
“The Treaty encompasses not only direct expropriation (i.e. a formal Government taking) 
but also de facto or indirect expropriations which do not involve actual takings of title but 
nonetheless result in the effective loss of management, use or control, or a significant 
depreciation of the value, of the assets of a foreign investor.”110  
 
Accordingly, the tribunal moved on to examine the effect of the government measures. 
While examining the effect of the government conduct, the tribunal came into a conclusion 
that the effect must not always be economic and stated that: 
 
“Equally, whilst accepting that effects of a certain severity must be shown to qualify an act 
as expropriatory, there is nothing to require that such effects be economic in nature. A 
distinction must be drawn between (a) interference with rights and (b) economic loss. A 
substantial interference with rights may well occur without actually causing any economic 
damage which can be quantified in terms of due compensation. In other words, the fact that 
the effect of conduct must be considered in deciding whether an indirect expropriation has 
occurred, does not necessarily import an economic test.” 111 
 
The tribunal justified its interpretation by the rules of treaty interpretation and concluded 
that:  
 
“In this case, the BIT does not include “economic damage” as a requirement for 
expropriation, and the Arbitral Tribunal does not consider that it must or should be 
imported.”112  
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At the end the tribunal concluded that expropriation had occurred.113 As to the public interest 
concerns, the tribunal did not give any weight to the possible public interest behind the 
government measures. It only rather quickly stated that: 
 
“The Arbitral Tribunal recognises that many tribunals in other cases have tested 
governmental conduct in the context of indirect expropriation claims by reference to the 
effect of relevant acts, rather than the intention behind them.”114 
 
 
7.5. Chemtura Corporation v. Canada 
 
In the case of Chemtura Corporation v. Canada, the tribunal was confronted with a dispute 
relating to the use of environmentally harmful chemicals. Chemtura was a manufacturer of 
a lindane-based pesticide. Lindane had been banned in numerous countries due to its harmful 
effects on the health and environment. Canada decided to also enact regulation banning the 
use of lindane in its territory. This according to Chemtura constituted an indirect 
expropriation of its investment. 115 
The tribunal first determined indirect expropriation, by referring to the effect of 
substantial deprivation by stating that:  
 
“For a measure to constitute expropriation under Article 1110 of NAFTA, it is common 
ground that (i) bad faith on the part of the Respondent is not required, and (ii) the measure 
must amount to a substantial deprivation of the Claimant's investment.”116 
 
The tribunal examined the existence of indirect expropriation initially, by applying a 
substantial deprivation test. According to the tribunal: 
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“-- in assessing whether the Claimant has suffered an indirect expropriation or a measure 
tantamount to expropriation, the Tribunal must determine whether the measures challenged 
under this heading, i.e. the cancellation of Chemtura Canada's lindane registrations, 
amounted to a "substantial deprivation" of the Claimant's investment.”117 
 
The tribunal executed the examination, by concentrating on the economic effect that the 
government measures had on the investment, and concluded that the effects did not amount 
to substantial deprivation.118  
The public interest behind the government measure was recognized by the tribunal and 
it endorsed the police powers doctrine after having already concluded that no indirect 
expropriation had occurred and stated that:  
 
“-- the measures challenged by the Claimant constituted a valid exercise of the Respondent's 
police powers. As discussed in detail in connection with Article 1105 of NAFTA, the PMRA 
took measures within its mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by the 
increasing awareness of the dangers presented by lindane for human health and the 
environment. A measure adopted under such circumstances is a valid exercise of the State's 
police powers and, as a result, does not constitute an expropriation.”119 
 
When endorsing the police powers doctrine, the tribunal had clearly first determined the 
existence of indirect expropriation. The police powers doctrine seems to be, hereby,  
endorsed as a possible exception/justification criterion. 
 
 
7.6. S.D. Myers v. Canada 
 
The case of S.D. Myers v. Canada confronted the difficult question of hazardous waste. S.D. 
Myers, Inc. (SDMI) was a U.S. corporation that processed and disposed of an 
environmentally hazardous chemical compound polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB). SDMI 
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created an affiliate in Canada in order to obtain PCB waste, and treat it in the SDMI’s 
facilities in the U.S.. Promptly after SDMI was granted a permission to import PCB waste 
to the U.S. from Canada by the U.S. government, Canada issued an order that banned the 
export of PCB waste to the U.S..120 SDMI claimed that, among other breaches of the NAFTA 
Chapter 11, Canada had indirectly expropriated its investment. Canada on the other hand 
claimed that the ban was due to environmental concerns, and did not constitute 
expropriation. 
The tribunal started the analysis by acknowledging the tension between regulatory acts 
and acts constituting expropriation. The tribunal, however, ended up defining indirect 
expropriation by stating that: 
 
“An expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability of an owner to make 
use of its economic rights although it may be that, in some contexts and circumstances, it 
would be appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to an expropriation, even if it were 
partial or temporary.”121 
 
Even though the tribunal stated, that it shall look both to the effect and to the purpose of the 
government measure when examining the existence of indirect expropriation, the tribunal 
did not examine the purpose behind the measure in its reasoning.122 The tribunal examined 
the existence of expropriation initially, by examining the effect that the government measure 
had on the investment. Since the measure was temporary and postponed the Claimants 
venture to the market only for 18 months, the tribunal concluded that the effect did not 
amount to expropriation.123 
In a separate opinion, Dr. Bryan Schwartz argued for the need for separating normal 
regulation and expropriation.124  However, Schwartz also concluded that regulations cannot 
be per se excluded from the scope of indirect expropriations by stating that: 
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“I cannot make a categorical statement that Article 1110 can never address a governmental 
measure that is presented as a regulation.”125 
 
Schwartz seems at the end also to endorse the idea of the effect as a dividing factor between 
normal regulation and measures constituting  expropriation by stating that: 
 
“Expropriations tend to be severe deprivations of ownership rights; regulations tend to 
amount to much less interference.”126 
 
 
7.7. Burlington v. Ecuador 
 
The case of Burlington v. Ecuador was a case regarding oil production. Burlington Resources 
Inc. invested in several oil production facilities in Ecuador. Due to a substantial rise in oil 
prices, a new tax regulation imposing a 50 per cent tax on the extraordinary profits of the oil 
companies was enacted. Later Ecuador raised the tax to 99 per cent. Due to Burlington’s 
decision of stopping to pay the tax, Ecuador seized and auctioned off Burlington’s shares of 
the oil production. Ecuador also took possession of the production facilities after Burlington 
threatened to stop the production, and annulled the production services contracts by a 
ministerial decree.127 Burlington claimed that due to these actions its investment was 
indirectly expropriated. 
The Burlington tribunal first addressed the concept of creeping expropriation while 
simultaneously determining indirect expropriation by the effect of the measure (or 
measures). Accordingly, the tribunal moved on to examine the effect of each alleged measure 
in order to conclude whether the measures alone or together would constitute indirect 
expropriation.128 The tribunal had to first consider when tax regulation could be deemed 
expropriatory. The tribunal interestingly first notes that  even though “taxation is an essential 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL,  Separate Opinion by Dr. Bryan 
Schwartz (on the Partial Award), para 206!!
126!S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL,  Separate Opinion by Dr. Bryan 
Schwartz (on the Partial Award), para 211!
127 Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5,  Decision on 
Liability, para 1-66 
128 Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5,  Decision on 
Liability, para 348!!
 37 
prerogative of State sovereignty”, there are limits to the state’s power to tax found in 
customary international law.129 According to the tribunal: 
 
“Customary international law imposes two limitations on the power to tax. Taxes may not 
be discriminatory and they may not be confiscatory. -- Among the factors to be considered 
one  counts first and foremost the tax rate and the amount of payment required. If the amount 
required is so high that taxpayers are forced to abandon the property or sell it at a distress 
price, the tax is confiscatory.”130  
 
According to the tribunal, the concept of confiscatory taxation appears to correspond to 
expropriatory taxation.131 The tribunal further stated that the most important factor in order 
to determine whether taxation is confiscatory and expropriatory is the effect of the tax.132 
The tribunal also noted that:  
 
“When assessing the evidence of an expropriation, international tribunals have generally 
applied the sole effects test and focused on substantial deprivation.”133  
 
Accordingly, the tribunal examined the existence of indirect expropriation  initially by 
examining the effect that the regulatory measures of the government had on the 
investment.134 
The Burlington tribunal, however, also endorsed the police powers doctrine, but clearly 
as a justification/exception doctrine. The placement of the police powers considerations 
would be, therefore, after the initial assessment of the existence of an expropriation. The 
tribunal demonstrated this, by stating that assessment of indirect expropriation follows a 
three-tier analysis:  
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“Accordingly, a State measure constitutes expropriation under the Treaty if (i) the measure 
deprives the investor of his investment; (ii) the deprivation is permanent; and (iii) the 
deprivation finds no justification under the police powers doctrine.”135  
!
!
!
!
7.8. Methanex v. United States of America 
 
Another case confronting the issue of environmentally harmful chemicals was the case of 
Methanex v. United States of America. Due to environmental concerns the state of California 
prohibited the use of MTBE (methyl tert-butyl ether) because it was causing pollution in the 
surface water and the groundwater. Methanex a Canadian corporation was a leading 
manufacturer of methanol in the American market. Methanex did not produce MTBE. 
However, a large percentage of the methanol it manufactured was used in the production of 
MTBE.136 Among other breaches of Chapter 11 of NAFTA, Methanex claimed that by 
banning the use of MTBE the U.S. had taken measures amounting to expropriation.  
The Methanex tribunal did not provide any determination for indirect expropriation. It 
went straight to endorsing the police powers doctrine and stated that: 
 
“But as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public 
purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a 
foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific 
commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then putative foreign 
investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain from such 
regulation.”137  
 
The Methanex tribunal also stated regarding the intent behind the alleged expropriatory 
measure  that:  
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“In the Tribunal’s view, Methanex is correct that an intentionally discriminatory regulation 
against a foreign investor fulfils a key requirement for establishing expropriation.”138 
 
The tribunals statement that an intentionally discriminatory regulation would be a 
constructive criterion when determining the existence of indirect expropriation is a bit out 
of place. A non-discriminatory nature of the measure is a requirement of lawful 
expropriation. This means that the discriminatory nature of the act would be a key 
requirement for establishing that the expropriation was unlawful, but cannot determine 
whether an expropriation has occurred. The tribunal came into the conclusion that no 
expropriation had occured since the measures take by the U.S. were for a public purpose, 
non-discriminatory and accomplished with due process, and therefore, the requirements that 
the police powers doctrine provides were fulfilled.139 
 
 
7.9. Tecmed v. Mexico 
 
In the case of Tecmed v. Mexico, an investment tribunal was once more confronted with the 
issues relating to hazardous waste. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. (Tecmed) 
subsidiary of a Spanish investor bought a landfill of hazardous waste and related assets 
including a permit that was necessary in order to operate the landfill. Tecmed claimed that 
Mexico had indirectly expropriated its investment due to the fact that Mexican authorities 
refused to renew the permit that was necessary in order for Tecmed to operate the landfill.140 
The Tecmed tribunal also defined indirect expropriation by reffering to the effect of a 
government measure and stated that:  
 
”Although these forms of expropriation do not have a clear or unequivocal definition, it is 
generally understood that they materialize through actions or conduct, which do not explicitly 
express the purpose of depriving one of rights or assets, but actually have that effect.”141 
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Accordingly, the tribunal stated that the initial way of determining whether an indirect 
expropriation has occurred is to be executed, by examining the effect of the regulatory 
measure. According to the tribunal:  
 
“To establish whether the Resolution is a measure equivalent to an expropriation under the 
terms of section 5(1) of the Agreement, it must be first determined if the Claimant, due to 
the Resolution, was radically deprived of the economical use and enjoyment of its 
investments, as if the rights related thereto —such as the income or benefits related to the 
Landfill or to its exploitation— had ceased to exist. In other words, if due to the actions of 
the Respondent, the assets involved have lost their value or economic use for their holder 
and the extent of the loss. This determination is important because it is one of the main 
elements to distinguish, from the point of view of an international tribunal, between a 
regulatory measure, which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of the state’s police 
power that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto expropriation that deprives 
those assets and rights of any real substance.”142 
    
The Tecmed tribunal also proceeded to interpret the expropriation clause according to 
the general rules of treaty interpretations and notified that: 
 
“After reading Article 5(1) of the Agreement and interpreting its terms according to the 
ordinary meaning to be given to them (Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention), we find no 
principle stating that regulatory administrative actions are per se excluded from the scope 
of the Agreement, even if they are beneficial to society as a whole —such as environmental 
protection—, particularly if the negative economic impact of such actions on the financial 
position of the investor is sufficient to neutralize in full the value, or economic or commercial 
use of its investment without receiving any compensation whatsoever.”143 
 
The tribunal, however, stated that in order to determine whether the state measures are to be 
deemed expropriatory, it has to examine whether the measures are proportional to the public 
interest presumably pursued. The tribunal concluded that the effect will play a key role in 
the proportionality analysis.144 According to the tribunal: 
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“There must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight 
imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory 
measure. To value such charge or weight, it is very important to measure the size of the 
ownership deprivation caused by the actions of the state and whether such deprivation was 
compensated or not.”145 
 
The tribunal came into the conclusion that the measures taken in the purpose of protecting 
the environment were not proportional to the effect caused to the interests of the investor 
and concluded that expropriation had occurred.146 The tribunal referred to the practice of the 
ECHR to support the endorsement of the proportionality analysis.147 The transplantation of 
the proportionality analysis from the practice of the ECHR is, however, problematic for 
several reasons, and as expected the Tecmed tribunal did not manage to apply the 
proportionality analysis in an appropriate manner. The problem of transplanting the 
proportionality analysis from the practice of the ECHR will be discussed in detail later.  
 
 
7.10. Conclusions of the case law analysis 
 
After examining the case law, it seems to be rather evident that the term indirect 
expropriation is determined, by a reference to the depriving effect of a government measure. 
The same conclusion can be made when examining the academy writings.148 Even scholars, 
that do endorse the police powers doctrine, determine the term indirect expropriation initially 
by referring to the effect of the measure. Also it seems to be quite obvious that the initial 
way to determine the existence of indirect expropriation has been executed, by examining 
the effect that a government measure has on the investment.149    
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As to the observations to the question of the weight given to the public interest concerns, 
no unified opinion was found. Some tribunals explicitly stated that the public interest of 
protecting the environment has no weight in the determination of whether an indirect 
expropriation has occurred while some recognized the idea of public interest, but the 
consideration of it was rather non existent in their rulings. Tribunals endorsing the police 
powers doctrine gave the most considerable weight to the public interest. 
The placement and way of endorsement of the police powers doctrine in the practice 
suggest that the police powers doctrine is an exception doctrine. Also the way in which the 
police powers doctrine is endorsed in the academy writings would suggest the same.150 
Following this rationale, the determination of the existence of an indirect expropriation 
would follow the sole effects doctrine, and the police powers doctrine would provide a 
possible exception. When acknowledging the role of the police powers doctrine as an 
exception to the main rule (determining the existence of indirect expropriation by examining 
the effect), one must also adjust the legal arguments to comply with this role. Since the terms 
used in the expropriation clauses normally do not contain any exceptions to the main rule, 
in order to legally support the police powers doctrine, one must prove that there is a norm of  
customary international law providing this exception to the treaty rule.  
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
!
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8. The Critique 
 
8.1. The purpose of the critique 
 
One could see that the purpose of this critique is just to make an argument that the sole 
effects doctrine is a more appropriate method to determine when regulation amounts to 
expropriation. This is partly true. I do believe that in the current state of the international 
investment law, the sole effects doctrine should prevail. However, I do not wish to deny that 
the police powers doctrine might have some potential. Considering that in the current 
political climate the police powers doctrine is often seen as the more legitimate one, it is 
expected that regardless of its shortcomings, this doctrine is gonna keep on developing and 
evolving in the practice. Therefore, the second function of this critique is to provide 
constructive criticism that can possibly guide the development of the police powers doctrine 
into a more legally sustainable one.  
I will execute the critique, by first analysing the legal support found for each doctrine 
from the investment treaties and the customary international law. After that, I will discuss 
separately the issue of finding balance between the competing legitimate interests and the 
possibility of utilizing the proportionality analysis developed in the practice of ECHR in the 
context of indirect expropriations.  
 
 
8.2. The lack of legal support from the investment treaties 
 
I will start the critique of the police powers doctrine with the argument of the most 
fundamental weight, and that is the lack of legal support from the investment treaties. As 
discussed in chapter five, the VCLT applies to the investment treaties. Therefore,  the rules 
of treaty interpretation shall be applied when interpreting the expropriation clauses. Let us 
take one more look at the representative expropriation clause, the Article 13(1) of the ECT. 
According to the Article 13 (1):   
 
“Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting Party 
shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as "Expropriation") 
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except where such Expropriation is: 
(a) for a purpose which is in the public interest; 
(b) not discriminatory; 
(c) carried out under due process of law; and 
(d) accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.”151 
 
When interpreting this expropriation clause in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose, its quite hard to find any support for the police powers doctrine.  
When interpreting the expropriation clause according to the ordinary meaning of the 
terms, it seems quite evident that no type of government measure is excluded from the scope 
of the clause. As seen in the case law review, the Tecmed tribunal initially made the same 
observation.152 Also considering that many treaties explicitly define indirect expropriation 
through the effect of the measure, the ordinary meaning would lead quite clearly to the 
application of the sole effects doctrine. In addition to that, the text of the expropriation 
clauses does not leave any room for exceptions of any kind. The text expresses very clearly 
that if a government takes a measure that has the same effect as direct expropriation, the 
investor is entitled for adequate compensation. The text itself leaves no room for discretion 
on this regard. There are also no exceptions regarding the obligation to pay compensation 
according to text of the treaties. One must use quite a lot of imagination to find any support 
for the police powers exception from the wording and terms of the expropriation clauses.  
While the police powers doctrine not only finds no support from the text of the treaty, it 
also contradicts the whole provision regarding indirect takings, by borrowing the 
requirements of lawful expropriation, except of course the requirement of adequate 
compensation. It cannot be in accordance with the good faith interpretation of the treaty text 
that the police powers doctrine takes part of the legality criteria and turns it into an exception 
criteria. By borrowing the criteria of lawful expropriation, the police powers doctrine 
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diminishes the text of the treaty. Because the public purpose, according to the text of the 
treaty, shall be treated as a legality requirement, it shall not simultaneously work 
contradictingly as an exception criterion.153 Therefore, the public purpose of the measure 
should  not be taken into account when determining the existence of an expropriation.154 The 
same can be said of the requirements regarding the non-discriminatory nature and the due 
process of the measure. Also using the criteria of ‘general regulation’ as a divider is rather 
problematic due to the broadness of the term, and the fact that the main way of a state to 
indirectly expropriate foreign property is by using some type of regulatory measure 
considering that the criteria of  lawful expropriation require the state to follow the due 
process. If one would exclude all general regulatory measures from the scope of indirect 
expropriation, the protection against indirect expropriations would largely lose its meaning. 
As concluded in the case law study, the police powers doctrine is an exception doctrine. 
Interpreting a treaty text in a good faith also does not allow one to come up with an exception 
to the treaty text that has no support from the text of the treaty, and in addition diminishes 
the text of the treaty.   
Finding support for the police powers doctrine from the context and the object and 
purpose of the investment treaties is also tricky. The fundamental purpose of the investment 
treaties is undeniably the protection of foreign investors in order for the host state to attract 
more foreign capital.155 Even though some treaties might also give notice to the state’s right 
to regulate in the preamble,156 this does not create a strong enough foundation to interpret 
the treaty by contradicting the ordinary meaning given to the text.  
The VCLT Article 31(3)(c) does leave a small door open for the “relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties”.  However, as noted in 
chapter five, no conflict between expropriation clauses and norms requiring the state to take 
action in the public interest exists. Therefore, international treaties obliging the state to 
regulate are in line with the textual interpretation of the expropriation clauses.  
Since interpreting the expropriation clauses according to the Article 31 does not leave 
the meaning ambiguous or obscure, nor does it lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or 
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unreasonable, there is no need for using the supplementary means of interpretation laid down 
in the Article 32 of the VCLT. 
Therefore, it shall be concluded that the police powers exception does not find any legal 
support from the investment treaties themselves. The sole effects doctrine on the other hand 
finds its legal support from the text of the investment treaties, and according to the rules of 
treaty interpretation should prevail. Next, it is essential to turn to the customary international 
law, and examine whether sufficient legal support for the police powers exception could be 
found there.  
 
 
8.3. The lack of support from customary international law 
 
Due to the complete lack of support from investment treaties, the police powers doctrine 
usually turns to the customary international law to find legal support. The Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute recognizes the norms of customary international law as a source of international 
law besides treaties and general principles of international law. To refresh the mind, 
customary international law consists of general practice accepted as law.157 Since a profound 
examination of the existence of a customary international law norm would require extensive 
research, that cannot be provided in this thesis, rather than trying to establish the existence 
of a customary international law norm, I will concentrate on pointing out factors that indicate 
against the existence of a such norm.158 Since the notion of the police powers of a state is 
recognized by both of the doctrines, the existence of the police powers of a state per se  under 
customary international law is not questioned here. This examination concentrates on 
examining whether there is a customary international law norm that would provide an 
exception to the investment treaty provisions regarding indirect expropriation, by excluding 
regulatory measures from the scope of indirect expropriations.  
The first factor indicating that no general practice exists excluding regulatory measures 
from the scope of indirect expropriations, is the fact that no unified opinion among the 
scholars, nor in the practice of the arbitration tribunals exists regarding such a norm. Almost 
all the scholars writing about the scope of indirect expropriation state that no unified opinion 
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exists on how to determine the existence of a regulatory expropriation.159 It became also 
evident  when examining the case law that in practice no unified opinion exists regarding the 
police powers exception. The question of when regulatory measures of the state shall be 
deemed expropriatory is described as controversial and highly disputed. As Soloway puts it:  
 
“Generally, both domestic and international law distinguish between the exercise of police 
power on the one hand and expropriation on the other. However, there does not appear to 
be any universally agreed set of principles as to when one government action should fall into 
one category and another in the other".160  
 
Naturally, the fact that the exact scope of a customary international law norm is disputed 
does not necessarily mean that the norm does not exist. However, it is a strong indicator that 
the existence of such norm is rather questionable. Also in the case of indirect expropriation, 
it is not only the scope of the police powers exception that remains disputed, but the existence 
of the exception itself as well.  
The second factor indicating against the existence of the police powers exception is the 
fact that the ECHR has not recognized such exception in its practice when interpreting the 
right to property. According to the Protocol 1 Article 1 (Protection of property) :  
 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.  
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 
 
The ECHR has not concluded that regulatory measures of the state would be excluded from 
the scope of this Article. Sometimes the practice of the ECHR has been referred to when 
arguing for the existence of the police powers exception.161 This line of argument has, 
however, confused several factors with each other. First, it has been suggested that in the 
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practice of the ECHR it is rather uncommon that the court would rule that a regulation would 
constitute a deprivation of property. However, the reason for this is not the fact that the 
ECHR excludes regulatory measures from the scope of de facto expropriation, but the fact 
that the ECHR has applied a high threshold for the effect that is required for a measure to 
constitute de facto expropriation.162 The ECHR, therefore, follows the sole effects doctrine 
when determining the existence of de facto expropriation. Second, the placement of the 
public purpose arguments in a case of a deprivation of property and in a case of control of 
the use of property is in the stage of determining whether the state measure was 
permissible.163 Therefore, in the practice of the ECHR the public purpose is not considered 
in the stage of determining if a de facto expropriation or a control of the use of property has 
occurred. The legitimate public purpose comes into consideration when determining the 
lawfulness of such measure. Following this, the public interest considerations shall be placed 
in the stage of considering the lawfulness of an expropriation, and not in the stage of 
determining whether an expropriation has occurred as also the text of the expropriation 
clauses provides.  
When interpreting the Protocol 1 Article 1 in practice, the ECHR has considered that in 
the case of de facto expropriation compensation is always required regardless of the public 
purpose of the measure even though the Article itself does not explicitly require it. The public 
purpose might in some circumstances reduce the amount of compensation that the state has 
to pay, but still some amount of compensation is required.164 Only in a case of a national 
emergency could the non-payment of the compensation be justified.165 In cases where the 
state interference does not amount to de facto expropriation, but is seen as a control of the 
use of the property, the amount of compensation paid is considered an important factor when 
determining if the measure was proportional.166 The ECHR has not, therefore, endorsed the 
police powers exception even though the text of the Protocol 1 Article 1 would be much 
more open to such considerations.   
As a third factor, I will discuss the US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law that is 
often cited in order to support the police powers exception. While the Restatement does 
endorse the idea of the police powers of a state, it does not exclude general regulatory 
measures per se from the scope of indirect takings. Even in a core area of practice of the 
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state’s police powers, such as enacting tax regulation, the Restatement recognized the 
possibility that the tax regulation might be deemed confiscatory due to the effects of such  
measures. The possibility to tax measures to constitute expropriation has also been 
recognized by scholars and legal practice.167 According to the Restatement:  
 
“A state is responsible as for an expropriation of property under Subsection (1) when it 
subjects alien property to taxation, regulation or other action that is confiscatory, or that 
prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or unduly delays, effective enjoyment of an alien's 
property or its removal from the state's territory.”168 
 
It has been acknowledged also in the practice of the investment tribunals that tax legislation, 
while enacting it usually is legitimate use of police powers, is under customary international 
law subject to restrictions. As seen in the case law review, the Burlington tribunal recognized 
that under the customary international law tax regulation shall not be confiscatory. The 
confiscatory nature of the tax measure is determined by the effect of the measure. Enacting 
tax regulation is seen as a fundamental part of the police powers of the state, however, it 
seems like it is generally accepted that even the right to enact tax regulation is subject to 
restrictions regarding the effect of such regulation. 
The position of the police powers exception as a norm of customary international law is 
also problematic with regard to the Article 27 of the VCLT. Just to repeat the Article 27 
provides that a state may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification for its 
failure to perform a treaty. Expropriation provisions provide that a state shall not expropriate 
foreign investment directly, or take measures with equal effects unless the given 
requirements are met. Therefore, a state has an international obligation to either refrain from 
taking measures with equal effects to direct expropriation, or to comply with the given 
requirements. A state shall not invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification to 
not to perform this obligation. In a case where a state takes regulatory measures causing the 
effect of expropriation, the state cannot justify its non-performance of the treaty obligations, 
by referring to the legitimacy of its internal law. Now repeating what the police powers 
exception actually attempts to say is that even if a state takes measures that cause the same 
effect as direct expropriation, the state does not have to comply with the treaty obligations 
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(especially the requirement of compensation) because the failure to perform the treaty is 
caused by legitimate internal legislation. Naturally, the police powers doctrine relies on the 
support of the customary international law, and therefore, it can escape the initial scrutiny of 
this provision. What is, however, important to note is that since the police powers exception 
basically contradicts the rule expressed in the Article of 27 of the VCLT, the need for the 
police powers exception to find strong enough legal support from the customary 
international law shall not be overlooked. 
As a last factor, I will discuss the contrived placement of the police powers exception. 
The supporters of the police powers doctrine seem to be quite confused, more or less 
intentionally, whether or not the police powers doctrine is a doctrine that determines whether 
or not an expropriation has occurred or a doctrine that excludes the obligation of the state to 
pay compensation if the expropriation is caused by a legitimate use of police powers. It 
seems like the importance of this differentiation has been disregarded, and presented only as 
an intellectual or scholarly problem that makes no real difference in practice. As Mofasa 
states: 
 
“Whether this is because the exercise of police powers precludes the measure being regarded 
as expropriatory, or whether it merely provides an exception to the rule that compensation 
must be paid for expropriation, is ultimately an academic question. The end result is the 
same: the police powers doctrine operates to exclude the State's liability.” 169 
 
Does it then really bear fruit to question whether the function of the police powers 
doctrine is to determine whether expropriation has occurred or to exclude the obligation of 
the state to pay compensation? In my opinion, this classification is extremely important. 
Without knowing the difference, one cannot build sufficient legal arguments to support the 
police powers exception. Determination of whether an expropriation has occurred, and on 
the other hand the level of compensation that the state is obliged to pay are two distinct issues 
in international law. Considering the high level of controversy still surrounding the 
determination of indirect expropriation, and the rather questionable position of the police 
powers exception under the customary international law, sufficient legal arguments shall not 
be overlooked.  As the police powers doctrine clearly establishes acceptability/justification 
criteria and not constructive criteria, it seems like the purpose of the police powers exception 
is to exclude the obligation to pay compensation. According to the police powers exception, 
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if certain acceptability criteria are met, the state should not be obliged to pay compensation. 
It is also common in the academy writings to refer to the police powers as an exception to 
the obligation to pay compensation.170 This clearly indicates that systematically the police 
powers doctrine should be understood as a doctrine excluding the duty to pay compensation. 
The police powers doctrine does not in any way differentiate whether a certain act happened 
or not. As seen in the case law review, the tribunals initially examine the existence of indirect 
expropriation, by examining the effect of a measure and not by the criteria provided by the 
police powers exception.  
Once agreed that the police powers exception is an exception regarding the obligation 
to pay compensation, the placement of police powers considerations should be in the stage 
of determining the amount of compensation and not in the stage of determining whether an 
expropriation has occurred. The supporters of the police powers doctrine might be reluctant 
to admit this since once accepting this, one must find strong enough legal arguments to 
counteract the clear treaty obligation that leaves no room for discretion. The investment 
treaties are very clear that if a direct or an indirect expropriation has occurred, the state has 
to pay adequate compensation. To counteract this strong rule, clearly laid down in the treaty 
text, might end up being too big of a task to tackle for the police powers exception. The 
transplantation of the police powers doctrine to the stage of determination of the existence 
of an expropriation can be seen as proof of its inadequacy. If the police powers exception  
would have strong enough legal support to make an exception to the compensation standard, 
it would not be transplanted to a place it does not initially belong. The only reason for its 
contrived transplantation to the stage of determining the existence of an expropriation is that 
it is not strong enough to contradict the rule that every expropriation shall be compensated.171  
Considering all these factors, the idea that the police powers exception should be 
considered as general practice accepted as law is hard to attain. Therefore, I cannot but 
conclude that the police powers doctrine does not find sufficient legal support from the 
customary international law.  
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8.4. Search for the balance 
 
A trend in the recent decisions and academy writings has been the search for a balance 
between the conflicting interests of the host state and of the investor.172 The interest of the 
investor is to seek protection against the expropriatory acts of the host state. The interest of 
the host state on the other hand is to maintain wide regulatory freedom in order to act in the 
public interest. In the context of this thesis, the pursued public interest would be the 
protection of the environment. Both of the interests are legitimate. Since the problematic 
surrounding indirect expropriation is seen as a problem of two competing interests, the main 
question the scholars often try to answer is the question of how should the regulatory 
interests of the host state and the interest of the investor be ‘balanced’ in the case of indirect 
expropriation. The main argument for the use of police powers doctrine has been its alleged 
ability to balance the conflicting interests of the investor and of the host state. However, the 
way the police powers doctrine is currently applied in the stage of determination whether an 
indirect expropriation has occurred does not have much of the claimed balancing ability. The 
police powers doctrine, used in the determination of whether an indirect expropriation has 
occurred, only endorses the either-or nature of the expropriation clauses. If the police powers 
exception would apply, the investor would not be entitled to any amount of compensation 
even though the state measure would deprive the economic benefit of the investment. One 
could hardly call this balanced. It is hard to argue that in a case where an investment loses 
all its economic value due to a state act, balance would be struck when the investor would 
get no compensation at all. According to the ECHR: 
 
“the taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value would 
normally constitute a disproportionate interference which could not be considered justifiable 
under Article 1 (P1-1). Article 1 (P1-1) does not, however, guarantee a right to full 
compensation in all circumstances. Legitimate objectives of "public interest", such as 
pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social 
justice, may call for less than reimbursement of the full market value.”173 
 
This expresses the view of the ECHR that a balance could hardly be found in a situation 
where no compensation would be given to the owner of the deprived property. Considering 
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this, it becomes quite clear that when used in the stage of determination whether an indirect 
expropriation has occurred, the police powers doctrine does not have the claimed balancing 
ability due to the either-or function of the expropriation clauses.  
Reciprocally, the main argument against the sole effects doctrine has been its inability 
to balance the conflicting interests of the investor and of the host state. However, when 
taking a closer look, the sole effects doctrine can be even better in the balancing than the 
police powers doctrine. I would dare to go even further, and argue that the sole effects 
doctrine is the product of balancing the conflicting interests. As stated before, the sole effects 
doctrine does not deny the existence of the police powers of the state. It does acknowledge 
that not every negative regulatory interference of the state is to be deemed expropriatory. 
Only when a government measure deprives all or near all economic value of the investment, 
the act is deemed expropriatory and compensation shall be paid. As argued above, one can 
hardly see the interest balanced when the investment loses all of its economic value due to a 
state measure, and the investor is provided no compensation at all.  
It is interesting that in case of direct expropriation the idea that the owner is entitled for 
compensation is hardly challenged, and seen as unbalanced. However, when the same effect 
is caused by an indirect measure, suddenly the obligation to pay compensation causes a huge 
unbalance. I shall demonstrate this argument by a fictional example. Let’s say that a foreign 
investor has a mining factory in an area that is found to be important for the protection and 
preservation of certain species. The host state has concluded a biodiversity treaty, and has 
an international obligation to protect and preserve the certain species. The state has two 
options. It can either legally transfer the title of the ownership of the investor’s property in 
order to turn the area into a protected area, or it can enact general regulation that would 
prevent the investor of using its investment, and turn the area into a protected area. In both 
cases, the investor would lose all economic benefits of its investment. Also the weight of the 
legitimate public interest in both cases would be the same. It is hard to argue why the investor 
would be in the first case entitled to full compensation, and in the second case given no 
compensation at all. Also, if the state would have the opportunity to escape the duty to pay 
compensation by going with the second option, it most certainly would. In the investment 
treaties, the two forms of expropriation, direct and indirect, are treated as the same for the 
very reason of preventing the states from escaping the obligation to pay compensation, by 
achieving the same goal through indirect measures. 
If it is agreed that balancing the interests, in a case where an investor would lose the 
economic value of its investment would require some amount of compensation to be paid, 
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solely the fact that states, when concluding investment treaties, decided that in case of 
deprivation of the investment the amount of adequate compensation would be appropriate 
does not create an ‘unbalance’. One should note that states made an intentional choice not 
to provide room for much discretion inside the standard of compensation.174 This indicates 
that in the opinion of the states only ‘adequate compensation’ would be appropriate in case 
of indirect expropriation.175  
 
 
8.5. Proportionality analysis 
 
8.5.1. Transplantation of the proportionality analysis 
 
As was seen in the case of Tecmed v. Mexico, some investment tribunals have started to 
transplant the proportionality analysis developed in the practice of the ECHR into to the 
determination of whether an indirect expropriation has occurred. From the point of view of 
balancing two divergent interest, the principle of proportionality might sound appealing as 
the means of solving the problem. Proportionality analysis is often seen to be the suitable 
instrument for finding the optimal solution when reconciling two conflicting interests. The 
aim of the principle of proportionality is to ensure that when pursuing a  noble public cause 
such as the protection of the environment, the adverse effect imposed on individual interests 
is proportionate.176 In the practice of the ECHR, the principle of proportionality has played 
a significant role in the context of the deprivation of property and of the control of the use 
of property. Transplantation of this analysis is, however, highly problematic and requires 
careful consideration. It shall never be too quickly assumed that principles developed in a 
particular legal system, municipal or regional,  would be automatically applicable on a global 
basis.177  
 
!
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174 See more on the history of the development of the compensation standard for expropriation 
under investment treaties: Hailu (2014), p. 11-17 
175 Muchlinski, Ortino & Schreuer (2008), p. 1069 
176!López (2014), p. 60!
177 Byrne (2000), p.118 
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8.5.2. Placement of the proportionality analysis 
 
The principle of proportionality has traditionally been an unfamiliar concept in the 
investment treaty sphere.178 When building his theory of global public interest in the 
investment law, Kulick presents a profound case for the proportionality analysis and its use 
in the interpretation and application of investment protection provisions. After taking a 
comparative look at other legal systems, Kulick identifies two different approaches of the 
application of the proportionality analysis. In the practice of the U.S., the place of the 
proportionality analysis is in the stage of assessment whether or not the state has infringed 
the protected freedom or right.179 The assessment of rights violations in the practice of the 
ECJ and the ECHR as well as in the German doctrine on the other hand follows a three-tier 
analysis. According to the three-tier analysis, the tribunal has to first define the scope of the 
right in question. Second, the tribunal needs to determine whether the state conduct has 
infringed the right. And third, it needs to examine whether a justification for the infringement 
exists i.e. if the infringement was permissible.180 According to Kulick, the U.S. is still far 
from wholeheartedly implementing the proportionality analysis partly since it would cause 
problems fitting into the doctrine of an uniform approach.181 It does not come as a surprise 
that Kulick sides with the three-tier approach. Following the three-tier approach, the place 
of proportionality analysis is in the last tier. Thus, the proportionality analysis serves no 
purpose in the first two stages. Therefore, when accepting the rationale of the three-tier 
analysis, proportionality arguments have no room in the stage of determining the scope of 
protection or whether a state has infringed the protected right. Translating this to the 
expropriation context would mean that when determining the scope of indirect expropriation 
the proportionality analysis i.e. the balancing of conflicting interests has no room. The same 
applies when determining whether or not the state regulatory measure constitutes an indirect 
expropriation. Only at the stage of determining the lawfulness of the expropriatory measure, 
the proportionality analysis would be applied. Since siding with the three-tier approach, 
Kulick argues that in the case of expropriation the right place for the balancing of the 
interests and for the proportionality analysis would be in the stage of determining whether 
the expropriation meets the legality criteria, and not in the stage of determining whether a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 Nikièma (2012), p. 15!!
179 Kulick (2012),  p. 195!!
180 Kulick (2012),  p. 196!
181 Kulick (2012),  p. 196!
 56 
direct or indirect expropriation has occurred. When accepting the rationale of the three-tier 
analysis, the arguments relating to balancing the conflicting interest of the investor and of  
the host state are not relevant in the determination of whether a regulatory act of the state 
constitutes an expropriation. Since the ECHR follows the three-tier analysis, one must be 
careful when citing the ECHR case law in the investment treaty sphere in order to support 
the use of the proportionality analysis. If relying on the doctrine that the ECHR follows, the 
place of the proportionality analysis is in the determination of the lawfulness of the 
expropriation. Therefore, one should not cite the ECHR case law in order to argue that an 
indirect expropriation has not occurred due to the fact that the government measure passed 
the test of proportionality analysis. This is the very mistake the Tecmed tribunal did when 
endorsing the proportionality analysis. The tribunal referred to the practice of the ECHR, 
and stated that: 
 
“the Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to determine if they are to be characterized as 
expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are proportional to the public interest 
presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking 
into account that the significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the 
proportionality.”182  
 
Interestingly, the tribunal referred to the chapter “C. Whether the interference was justified” 
of the ruling of the ECHR,183 and still did not comprehend the idea that the ECHR applies 
proportionality analysis when determining whether the de facto expropriation was 
permissible/lawful and not when determining the existence of the de facto expropriation.  
It shall also be noted that in the practice of ECHR the amount of compensation paid has 
been a key factor when deciding whether a measure was proportional and a fair balance 
found. According to the ECHR:  
 
“Clearly, compensation terms are material to the assessment whether the contested 
legislation respects a fair balance between the various interests at stake and, notably, whether 
it does not impose a disproportionate burden on the applicants”184 
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Therefore, the appropriate adoption of the proportionality analysis would require that first, 
the proportionality analysis would be executed in the stage of determining the lawfulness of 
the measure, and second, it would require that the either-or nature of the compensation 
requirement would be set aside, and the tribunals would be given wider room to decide what 
would amount to an appropriate compensation. The majority of the expropriation clauses, 
however, leave little to no room for proportionality considerations. It is notable that the text 
of the Article 1 of Protocol 1 is much more open to proportionality considerations than the 
typical expropriation clauses in the investment treaties.185  
 
 
8.5.3. Proportionality analysis and a law making judge 
 
Using the principle of proportionality as the defining test, when drawing the line between 
normal regulation and regulatory action constituting expropriation, is also problematic 
considering the adjudicative system created in the international investment law. Applying 
the principle of proportionality leaves arbitrators with quite a bit of room for discretion. As  
Kulick notes, one cannot ignore the function of the judge as law making when given the task 
to review political decisions enshrined in regulations and reconcile conflicting interests. 
Introducing the proportionality analysis will, therefore, come with the dangers that inhere in 
a law-making judge. The arbitrator is left with the task to determine how much emphasis on 
each competing interest shall be given, and at the end to decide which interest shall 
prevail.186 It is rightly so criticized that the adjudication system created in the international 
investment law is not ready to take on such a role.187 Transporting a principle from the case 
law of the ECHR that is a body of a specific legal system to an international investment 
treaty sphere, therefore, raises problems. The ad hoc arbitrators lack the same legitimacy as 
ECHR judges due to the nature of the international investment law. The international 
investment law as stated is based on complex network of bilateral investment treaties. 
Transplanting the considerations of highly subjective elements as the notion of 
proportionality is more problematic in the setting of an arbitral tribunal composed of private 
individuals and no appeal mechanism. It is to be concluded that the current state of 
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186!Kulick (2012),  p. 171-172 
187!More on the critique relating to the adjudication system developed in the international 
investment law see: Van Harten, G. (2007) 
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international investment law, especially regarding indirect expropriation, is not suitable for 
the transposition of the principle of proportionality.188 
 
 
8.5.4. The police powers doctrine and the proportionality test 
 
One might still suggest that the principle of proportionality might serve as the saviour of the 
police powers doctrine. The main problem with this approach is the fundamental argument 
that the police powers exception builds itself on, and that the acceptance of the 
proportionality requirement might end up working against it. The underlinening argument 
for the police powers doctrine is that states in the sphere of their police powers can act freely 
in the public interests without being obligated to pay compensation for the negative effects 
caused by regulative measures. When adding the proportionality requirement into the mix, 
the new doctrine would state that the states have such right only to the extent that the result 
of the regulative measure is proportional considering the interests of the negatively affected 
party. Since regulative measures that lead to a total deprivation of the value of the property 
without compensation are hardly ever seen proportional, the very idea of the police powers 
doctrine as an exception to the obligation to pay compensation would diminish. When 
applying the proportionality test, the option of not paying any compensation is hardly in the 
picture in case of de facto expropriations.  
 
 
8.6. Conclusions of the critique 
 
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that the sole effects doctrine should prevail since 
it finds sufficient legal support from the investment treaties. The police powers doctrine, on 
the other hand, does not have sufficient legal support from the sources of international law, 
and therefore, should not be applied. The Article 38 of the ICJ Statute expresses the 
commonly accepted sources of international law. According to the Article 38 of the ICJ:  
 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes 
as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
188 Nikièma (2012), p. 17!
 59 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states ; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations ; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination 
of rules of law. 
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et 
bond, if the parties agree thereto. 
 
According to this Article, the three sources of international law are treaties, norms of 
customary international law, and general principles. As demonstrated in this chapter, the 
police powers doctrine finds no legal support from the investment treaties. The legal support 
of customary international law seems to be questionable at the best, and the status of the 
police powers exception regarding expropriations as a general principle has not been even 
suggested in practice nor in academic writings. Therefore, one cannot but conclude that the 
police powers doctrine does not find sufficient legal support from the sources of international 
law. The sole effects doctrine, on the other hand, has sufficient legal support and shall 
therefore prevail.  
It has also been concluded that the police powers doctrine cannot be sustained by the 
arguments regarding the need for balancing the conflicting interests nor by endorsing the 
proportionality test developed in the practice of the ECHR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
!
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9. The next generation of expropriation clauses  
 
A trend among the recent investment treaties is the inclusion of provisions reaffirming the 
states’ right to regulate, and the use of explanatory annexes listing factors that an investment 
tribunal should consider when determining whether a state measure constitutes an 
expropriation.189 The Article 8.9 of the CETA reaffirms the states right to regulate. 
According to the Article 8.9:  
 
“1. For the purpose of this Chapter, the Parties reaffirm their right to regulate within their 
territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, 
safety, the environment or public morals, social or consumer protection or the promotion and 
protection of cultural diversity. 
 
2. For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party regulates, including through a modification 
to its laws, in a manner which negatively affects an investment or interferes with an investor's 
expectations, including its expectations of profits, does not amount to a breach of an 
obligation under this Section.” 
 
Regarding indirect expropriations, inclusion of provisions merely reaffirming the state’s 
right to regulate does not really limit the state’s potential liability for indirect expropriations. 
Understanding that expropriation clauses do not prohibit a state to take regulatory action, 
this provision would seem to have no impact whatsoever. It also does not exclude the 
obligation of the state to pay compensation in the case when the use of the right to regulate 
would lead to a substantial deprivation of the investment. This provision is also in line with 
the sole effects doctrine since as stated the sole effects doctrine does recognize the right of 
the state to regulate and that not every regulation that causes negative effects on the 
investment constitutes expropriation. Therefore, the mere reaffirmation of the right to 
regulate is not sufficient enough to exclude regulatory acts from the scope of indirect 
expropriation, or to prevent a tribunal form concluding that such regulatory acts could 
constitute expropriation.190 
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The CETA convention also contains an explanatory annex providing a list of factors that 
shall be considered when determining the existence of indirect expropriation. According to 
the Annex 8-A of the CETA:  
 
“The Parties confirm their shared understanding that: 
1. Expropriation may be direct or indirect: 
(a) direct expropriation occurs when an investment is nationalised or otherwise directly 
expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure; and 
(b) indirect expropriation occurs if a measure or series of measures of a Party has an effect 
equivalent to direct expropriation, in that it substantially deprives the investor of the 
fundamental attributes of property in its investment, including the right to use, enjoy 
and dispose of its investment, without formal transfer of title or outright seizure. 
2. The determination of whether a measure or series of measures of a Party, in a specific fact 
situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry 
that 
takes into consideration, among other factors: 
(a) the economic impact of the measure or series of measures, although the sole fact that a 
measure or series of measures of a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of 
an investment does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; 
(b) the duration of the measure or series of measures of a Party; 
(c) the extent to which the measure or series of measures interferes with distinct, reasonable 
investment-backed expectations; and 
(d) the character of the measure or series of measures, notably their object, context and 
intent. 
3. For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance when the impact of a measure or 
series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, 
non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate 
public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute 
indirect expropriations.”191 
 
Rather than endorsing the police powers doctrine, this explanatory clause does indeed 
recognize the possibility that regulative measures taken in the public purpose could amount 
to expropriation, and therefore are not excluded from the scope of indirect expropriation or 
from the obligation to pay compensation. The explanatory clause determines indirect 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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expropriation, by referring to the effect, and endorses the idea that at the end the decisive 
weight is given to the effect of the measure. The legitimate public purpose and the character 
of the measure can be seen as factors raising the threshold of the severity of the effect. 
However, the severity of the depriving effect shall at the end determine the existence of 
indirect expropriation. Though only time will tell how tribunals will apply these newer treaty 
clauses in practice.  
Explanatory notes, like the CETA Annex 8-A , can be seen as one more indication that 
a norm excluding regulatory acts from the scope of indirect expropriation clauses does not 
exists in the customary international law. Form the wording of the explanatory notes one can 
clearly see that while the character of the government measure shall be taken into account 
when determining the existence of indirect expropriations, general regulatory measures are 
not excluded from the scope of indirect expropriations according to the understanding of the 
states.  
Notable is also the fact that while the recent treaties like CETA did not exclude the 
possibility that regulatory measures could  constitute expropriation, they did not modify the 
obligation to pay adequate compensation in case of indirect expropriation either. For instance 
CETA in Article 8.12 states that in case of expropriation, direct or indirect, full compensation 
which is adequate to the fair market value of the investment, shall be paid.  !
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10. Conclusions 
 
To conclude, this thesis has searched an answer to the question of how to determine when 
regulative measures amount to expropriation. After concluding this doctrinal study, it is 
evident that the sole effects doctrine should prevail as the appropriate method of examining 
the existence of indirect expropriation. While the police powers doctrine lacks sufficient 
legal support, and therefore, cannot be sustained, the sole effects doctrine finds firm legal 
support from the investment treaties. Even though in the current political climate, 
emphasising the environmental concerns and endorsing the police powers doctrine would be 
undeniably more politically legitimate and appealing, one shall not ignore the lack of 
appropriate legal support of the police powers exception. Even politically tense legal issues 
shall be resolved by legal norms.  
The discussion regarding regulatory expropriation often presents the states as victims 
and the foreign investors as unjust winners. This, I would say, is a rather neglectful way of 
presenting the situation. Investment treaties are international treaties concluded between 
sovereign states. Private investors have no legal power when these treaties are concluded. 
States, as sovereign subjects of international law, have all the power to conclude, terminate, 
and amend investment treaties according to their wishes. If a state no longer wishes to protect 
investors against indirect expropriation caused by regulatory measures, the state is free to 
make the required legal changes. As the recent trends regarding newer expropriation clauses 
demonstrate, states have been reluctant to totally exclude the regulatory measures from the 
scope of indirect expropriations, or to make exceptions to the obligation of paying adequate 
compensation in case of every indirect taking.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
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